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JURISDICTION AND DISCRETION
IN HYBRID LAW CASES
John F. Preis •

An everlasting debate in the federal courts field is which branch of
the federal government has the power to control federal jurisdiction.
While some commentators and judges assert that the judiciary has the
implicit authority to refine the boundaries of its jurisdiction, others
argue that Article III vests that authority with Congress only and
judicial modification ofjurisdiction is illegitimate. In focusing almost
entirely on the constitutional legitimacy of the question, this debate
has overlooked an important consideration: Even if the judiciary may
legitimately wield discretion in setting its jurisdiction, is such
discretion functionally appropriate?
This Article argues that such discretion is not always appropriate.
Relying on an empirical analysis of two decades of cases in one area
of federal jurisdiction-hybrid law jurisdiction-the Article
demonstrates that some jurisdictional questions are better resolved by
simple, bright-line rules. Drawing on extensive scholarship studying
rules and standards-which until now has not yet been applied in this
field-the Article concludes that the particular (and often
misunderstood) nature of hybrid law cases calls for a rule rather than
a standard. This conclusion, while limited to the field of hybrid law
jurisdiction, nonetheless suggests that the debate over judicial
Only by
discretion in jurisdictional questions is too narrow.
considering functionality as well as legitimacy can the proper
jurisdictional directives be formulated.

* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. J.D., Vanderbilt University
School of Law; B.S., Cornell University. This Article benefited greatly from comments by Jim
Concannon, Barry Friedman, Alex Glashausser, Rob Rhee, Bill Rich and Jim Wilson. In addition,
Kevin Zolotor provided valuable research assistance throughout the project.

145

146

UNIVERSITYOFCJNCINNATILAWREVIEW

[Vol. 75

I. Introduction .................................................................................... 147
II. Federal Question Jurisdiction in Hybrid Law Cases ..................... 149
A. Substantiality Analysis in the Supreme Court ..................... 152
1. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trost Company .......... 153
2. Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Thompson ........................... 154
3. Grable & Sons Metal Prod, Inc. v. Darne Eng'g
& Mfg . ..................................................................... 156
B. Substantiality Analysis in the Lower Courts ........................ 158
1. The Context In Which ofthe Federal Question
Appears ................................................................... 159
2. The Federal Laws Appearing in Hybrid Law
Cases ....................................................................... 162
3. The Degree ofReference to Federal Law ................ 163
4. The Reversal Rate in Hybrid Law Cases ................. 165
5. The Rate of Remand ................................................. 166
6. State Decision and Publication Rate ........................ 166
III. Rules and Standards in Jurisdiction over Hybrid Law Cases ........ 167
A. Rules and Standards: Definitions and Costs ........................ 169
B. Rules and Standards: Preferable Uses .................................. 171
1. Frequency ................................................................. 171
2. Homogeneity ............................................................ 173
3. Resources ofDecisionmakers .................................. 173
C. The Appropriate Legal Form for Deciding Jurisdictional
Questions in Hybrid Law Cases ........................................... 176
1. Frequency ................................................................. 176
2. Homogeneity ............................................................ 179
a. The factors relevant to the allocation of cases
between state and federal courts ....................... 180
b. The homogeneity ofhybrid law cases from a
jurisdictional perspective .................................. 186
3. Resources of Decisionmakers .................................. 190
IV. The Proper Rule in Hybrid Law Cases .......................................... 192
A. The Proper Courts to Adjudicate Hybrid Law Cases .......... 194
B. The Rule for Allocating Hybrid Law Cases to State
Courts ................................................................................... 200
V. Conclusion ..................................................................................... 202
VI. Appendix ........................................................................................ 203

2006]

HYBRID LAW CASES

147

I. INTRODUCTION

One of the most engrossing debates in the field of federal courts
concerns congressional control of federal jurisdiction. One aspect of
this debate is role of the judiciary in defining its own jurisdiction. On
one side of the debate are those who argue that Article III bestows
Congress with plenary power to control federal jurisdiction and that the
judiciary therefore has no role in its determination. 1 On the other side
are those who contend that the federal judiciary-with its comparative
expertise in jurisdictional considerations-should have leeway to refine
its jurisdiction as needed. 2 Along the continuum between these two
positions are numerous other views. 3
While this argument has both descriptive and normative elements, the
chief normative concern has always been legitimacy.4 That is, in light of
Article III and other relevant sources of law, is it legitimate for the
judiciary to exert any control over its jurisdiction? While the legitimacy
question is an essential inquiry, it is not the sole question that should be
explored. Even if one believes that the judiciary may define the
contours of its jurisdiction, that does not per force require the judiciary
to exercise its discretion in that field. Many commentators have
observed that broad discretion in the hands of judges often leads to
complex and often conflicting doctrine-typically an undesirable result. 5
I. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER 3-7, 47-139
(1991) (arguing that "underlying normative principles of American political theory"-the
representational and countermajoritarian principles-suggest that the judiciary should closely follow
congressional dictates in asserting or declining jurisdiction); Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation
of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984); Phillip B. Kurland, Toward
a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 489
( 1959); Gene R. Shreve, Pragmatism Without Politics-A Half Measure of Authority for Jurisdictional
Common Law, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 767 (1991).
2. David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 574-88 (1985);
Michael Wells, Why Professor Redish is Wrong about Abstention, 19 GA. L. REv. 1097 (1985); Daniel J.
Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1891 (2004).
3. See, e.g, Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal
Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. I, 2 (1990) (arguing that "the boundaries of federal jurisdiction-and
the authority to define that jurisdiction-evolve through a dialogic process of congressional enactment
and judicial response"); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bridging the Enforcement Gap in Constitutional Law: A
Critique of the Supreme Court's Theory That Self-Restraint Promotes Federalism, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1289, 1329 (2005) (arguing that "Article Ill requires federal courts to decide 'all cases' but not all
'Controversies"' and that federal judges may decide to "punt" certain "Controversies").
4. The leading article describing the discretion employed by federal courts in defining their
jurisdiction is Shapiro, supra note 2, at 548-59 (noting the myriad ways in which federal courts exert
control over their jurisdiction, such as the doctrines of abstention, justiciability, and exhaustion, as well
as the interpretation of the jurisdictional statutes).
5. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42
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Therefore, even if scholars could solve the legitimacy problem, they
would have to face a secondary problem: the risk of doctrinal instability.
The role of discretion in judicially-created jurisdictional doctrine
assumed a central role recently in the Supreme Court case Grable &
Sons Metal Prod. Inc. v. Darue Eng 'g & Mfg. Co. 6 Grable & Sons was
a "hybrid law" case, meaning that it involved both state and federal law.
The question for the Supreme Court was whether this suit-being a
traditional state law cause of action-fell within the district court's
federal question jurisdiction because its disposition turned on the
interpretation of a federal statute. The Court held that the suit "arose
under" federal law and therefore fell within federal question
jurisdiction. 7 While this holding may not seem particularly remarkable,
what is remarkable is the analysis the Court used to determine whether
to assert jurisdiction in hybrid law cases. Declining to promulgate a
"'single, precise, all-embracing' test for jurisdiction," the Court instead
instructed lower courts to inquire whether a "state-law claim necessarily
raise[ s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a
federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally
approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities. " 8 In other
words, the Supreme Court instructed lower courts to use their discretion
to determine when to assert federal question jurisdiction. While this
discretion is not unlimited, its boundaries are far and wide. A district
court will feel little constrained by the Supreme Court's mandate to
consider the "congressionally approved balance of federal and state
judicial responsibilities." 9 Thus, Grable & Sons stands for the
proposition that discretion within the lower courts is preferable to a
bright-line rule for determining jurisdiction over hybrid law cases.
This Article disagrees with the Supreme Court on this issue and, in
doing so, demonstrates that the "legitimacy" debate in the federal courts
field is inappropriately narrow. A fuller debate of "jurisdiction and
discretion" should take account of functionality as well as legitimacy.
To make this case, the Article relies on an analysis of every hybrid law
jurisdiction decision published by a circuit court since 1986 (the year the
DUKE L.J. I, 10-11 (1992) (documenting an increase in legal complexity and attributing it in part to an
increase in discretionary, standard-based legal directives). To be sure, the problem of stability is not
unrelated to the problem of legitimacy. Inasmuch as discretion and the ensuing doctrinal fuzziness
weaken the rule of law, the legitimacy of the institution is weakened. A lawsaying institution with a
weak rule of law is typically viewed as less legitimate than institutions with a stronger rule of law. See
Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 953,974-78 (1995).
6. 125 S. Ct. 2363 (2005).
7. !d. at 2368.
8. !d.
9. !d. at 2367.
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Court last addressed hybrid law jurisdiction questions). 10 Building on
this description of hybrid law doctrine, the Article then turns to a
description of rules and standards. After identifying the traits of each
legal form, the Article concludes that a rule is preferable to a standard
for jurisdictional issues in hybrid law cases. Having established this, the
Article relies on the commonly accepted purposes of federal jurisdiction
to argue that federal courts should assert jurisdiction over hybrid law
cases only when the federal question embedded in the state cause of
action is supported by a federal cause of action.
Contrary to this analysis, the Supreme Court has already chosen a
discretionary approach and is unlikely to revisit the issue anytime soon
(much less, reverse its position). The purpose of this Article, however,
is not solely to advocate for a rule-bound approach; rather, it is to show
that the debate over discretion in jurisdiction cannot take place solely in
the realm oflegitimacy. Instead, functionality must be an essential, even
if secondary, consideration.
II. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION IN HYBRID LAW CASES
Federal question jurisdiction has its genesis, of course, in Article III
of the U.S. Constitution. Section 2 of that article states that "The
judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the Untied States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority." 11 The modern
scope of federal question jurisdiction, however, is not controlled by
Article Ill but rather by an implementing statute first passed by
Congress in 1875. Though the statute, now codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, employs the same "arising under" language used in Article III, 12
statutory federal question jurisdiction is in practice much narrower than
its constitutional counterpart. 13

I 0. Numbering 67 in all, these cases are listed and described in the Appendix at the end of the
Article.
II. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2.
12. Section 1331 provides that "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
13. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank ofNig., 461 U.S. 480,494-95 (1983) ("Although the language
of § 1331 parallels that of the 'arising under' clause of Article lll, this Court never has held that
statutory 'arising under' jurisdiction is identical to Article Ill 'arising under' jurisdiction."). See
generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, § 5.2 at 266-67 (2003) (addressing the
distinction between jurisdiction under Article Ill and under§ 1331). For excellent historical accounts of
the statutory grant of jurisdiction see James H. Chadbourn & A. Leo Levin, Original Jurisdiction of
Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. & AM. L. REG. L. REV. 639 (1942) and Ray Forrester, The Nature of a
"Federal Question," 16 TuL. L. REV. 362,374-77 (1942).
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Determining whether a matter "arises under" federal law for the
purposes of § 1331 is usually quite simple. Justice Holmes famously
explained in American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co. that "[a]
suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action." 14 Thus, the
existence of a federal cause of action for a given federal law guarantees
one access to a federal court. Yet, as has been noted, Justice Holmes's
test for jurisdiction is "more useful for inclusion than for the exclusion
for which it was intended." 15 Put differently, while the existence of a
federal cause of action demonstrates that a litigant's case arises under
federal law, 16 the lack of a federal cause has not been considered fatalin most federal courts at least-to federal question jurisdiction. Cases
that generally fall in this latter category, i.e., cases involving federal law
but not a federal cause of action, are typically of two types: (1) cases
relying wholly on the federal law for relief, and (2) cases relying
primarily on state law for relief but involving some aspect of federal
law. The first type of case-which this Article does not address-is one
where a party seeks to enforce a federal right but cannot point to a
congressionally created right of action. While the general rule is that
these cases are not cognizable in federal courts, 17 generous debate about
the appropriate rule continues. 18 The second type of case, which this
14. 241 u.s. 257,260 (1916).
15. T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.); see also Franchise
Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. I, 9 (1983) ("[I]t is well settled
that Justice Holmes' test is more useful for describing the vast majority of cases that come within the
district courts' original jurisdiction than it is for describing which cases are beyond district court
jurisdiction.").
16. A rare exception to this arises when Congress creates a right of action empowering a litigant
to bring suit but also directs that state law govern the disposition of the suit. In such a situation, federal
question jurisdiction has been held inappropriate. See Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505,
513 (1900).
17. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (refusing to imply a cause of action under Title
VI because the statute's text and legislative history revealed no congressional intent to allow private
enforcement); but see Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (implying a right of
action under Title IX for a wrongful discharge suit by a male basketball coach who complained about
discrimination against his female players).
18. For arguments in support of implying a federal right of action, see, e.g., Donald H. Zeigler,
Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 665, 666 (1987) (arguing that the existence of federal right is sufficient to imply a right
of action attendant to that right); Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An
Integrated Approach, 76 WASH. L. REV. 67, 68 (2001) (criticizing the Supreme Court's separate
inquiries into rights, rights of action and remedies); Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in
Determining the Existence of Implied Private Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861, 864-65
(1996); Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289,
322 (1995) (arguing that a right under the constitution should be "self-executing" and that a right of
action should not be required to enforce one's constitutional rights).
For arguments against implying federal rights of action, see, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., The RightRemedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87 (1999); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law
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Article does address, is one where a party seeks to enforce a state right
but, for whatever reason, the resolution of the state law claim will
involve the interpretation of federal law. As explained in detail later in
this Part, there are three main ways in which a state claim may involve
the interpretation of federal law. 19 For the present discussion, however,
a simple example will suffice.
Suppose a landowner rents land to a farmer. Because the landowner
wishes to preserve the environmental integrity of the land, he insists on
the following clause in the contract: "Farmer agrees to comply with all
applicable state and federal environmental laws during the term of this
contract." One day, the landowner observes the farmer dumping used
oil on a portion of the land. The landowner then brings suit in state
court against the farmer for breach of contract, citing a federal
environmental regulation prohibiting the farmer's conduct. The farmer
removes the case to federal court on the ground that the court would
have to interpret federal law to determine whether the farmer breached
the contract. Thus, on a motion to remand by the landowner, a federal
court would be called on to determine if the state-law breach of contract
action posed a federal question such that federal jurisdiction would be
appropriate. 20
Federal courts have employed a variety of doctrines to analyze these
types of jurisdictional questions. Although the doctrines have been
repeatedly misstated and confused with each other, four distinct
doctrines do in fact exist. These doctrines are (1) the well-pleaded
complaint rule, 21 (2) the necessity test, 22 (3) complete preemption
Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. I (1985); Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh,
Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1117 (1978) (arguing that the Court
lacks power to imply causes of action without congressional authority).
19. See discussion infra Part II.B. I.
20. This example necessarily assumes, as do all similar examples in this Article, that the parties
are non-diverse.
21. A "well-pleaded complaint" is one that, for purposes of federal jurisdiction, invokes federal
law. Such complaints merit federal jurisdiction while those without a federal issue do not. Left out of
any consideration under the well-pleaded complaint rule is whether the defendant's answer or asserted
defenses implicate any federal questions. Nor may federal jurisdiction lie if the plaintiff anticipates a
federal defense and preemptively responds to it the complaint. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v.
Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). For criticisms of the well-pleaded complaint rule, see, e.g., LARRY W.
Y ACKLE, RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURTS, I 02-05 ( 1994); Donald Doemberg, There "s No Reason
For It; It's Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal
Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (1987); Martin H. Redish. Reassessing the Allocation of
Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and ''The Martian
Chronicles," 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1794-97 (1992).
22. Where a complaint involves state and federal issues, federal jurisdiction will obtain only
where success on the federal issue is necessary to the plaintiff's success in the case. Thus, if a plaintiff
advances three separate theories in his complaint, each of which he alleges entitle him to relief, and only
one of those theories implicates federal law, then federal jurisdiction will not lie because relief could be

152

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

analysis, 23 and (4) substantiality analysis. Substantiality analysis, which
is the focus of the Article and the analysis ostensibly used in Grable &
Sons, differs from the other three methods in that it instructs judges to
consider principles of federalism in each and every instance, rather than
simply to follow a bright-line rule that follows these same federalism
principles.
The remainder of this Part describes substantiality analysis in detail.
The relevant Supreme Court cases are first discussed, followed by the
lower court cases decided over the past two decades.
A. Substantiality Analysis in the Supreme Court

Substantiality analysis seeks to determine whether the federal
question embedded within the state right of action is "substantial"
enough to warrant the energies of a federal court-the notion being that
insignificant or tangential federal issues do not merit federal jurisdiction.
This Section will introduce the general contours of substantiality
analysis by discussing several Supreme Court cases dealing with this
issue, among them Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, and Grable & Sons Metal Prod. v. Darue
Eng'g&Mfg.

obtained without reference to federal law. Put another way, jurisdiction will not obtain because federal
law is not necessary to his case. The relevant Supreme Court case on "necessity analysis" is
Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988). For a detailed and incisive
analysis of Christianson, see John B. Oakley, Federal Jurisdiction and the Problem of the Litigative
Unit: When Does What "Arise Under" Federal Law?, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1829 (1998).
23. In hybrid law cases, complete preemption analysis inquires whether the state law implicated
in the plaintiffs suit occupies a field that has been completely preempted by federal law. If the state law
is completely preempted, then the state law is "necessarily federal in character" and federal jurisdiction
may be invoked. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 56, 63--64 (1987). It is odd that complete
preemption should be grounds for federal jurisdiction because preemption claims almost always arise as
defenses and, under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a federal defense cannot create federal jurisdiction.
As has been noted, this amounts to an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. See Karen A.
Jordan, The Complete Preemption Dilemma: A Legal Process Perspective, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
927, 939 (1996) ("[T]he doctrine of complete preemption is an exception, or corollary, to the wellpleaded complaint rule.").
The seminal case in complete preemption analysis is Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int 'I Ass 'n
of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557 (1968). For a helpful exegesis of complete preemption analysis in the
Supreme Court and lower courts, see Arthur R. Miller, Artfo/ Pleading: A Doctrine in Search of
Definition, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1781, 1793-1800 (1998).
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1. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Company
Decided in 1921, Smith is generally regarded as the start of modem
hybrid law jurisdiction.Z4 The case involved a shareholder's challenge
to his company's intention to purchase various federal bonds. The
shareholder contended that the bonds, which were issued pursuant to
federal legislation, were unlawful because Congress did not have the
constitutional authority to authorize the issuance. Given this contention,
the shareholder brought suit against the company under a state statute
prohibiting investments in illegal securities.
Thus, the suit was primarily a creature of state law: the shareholder
alleged that his company violated state law. Yet the case also included
an embedded federal question because, in order to ascertain whether the
defendant had violated state law, the federal court needed to determine
the constitutionality of Congress's issuance of the bonds. Thus, the
Smith Court faced the question of whether a federal court not sitting in
diversity could adjudicate a state-created cause of action if resolving the
state claim required resolution of an embedded federal question.
The Smith Court held that federal jurisdiction was appropriate.
Borrowing from a seminal federal question case, Osborn v. Bank of
United States, the Court held that federal jurisdiction exists if "the title
or right set up by the party may be defeated by one construction of the
Constitution or law of the United States, and sustained by the opposite
construction."25 Because the plaintiff's claim "depend[ed] upon the
construction or application of the Constitution or laws of the United
States," the Court opined, "the District Court ha[d] jurisdiction under
[the federal question statute]."26
After Smith, one thing seemed clear: a federal question exists if
federal law must be interpreted.
This clarity, however, all but
disappeared with the Supreme Court's next major statement on the
matter in Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Thompson.

24. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
25. Jd. at 199 (quoting Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738,822 (1824)).
The Court also relied on a similar but earlier statement by Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia
that "[a] case ... may truly be said to arise under the Constitution or a law of the United States,
whenever its correct decision depends upon the construction of either." Smith, 255 U.S. at 199 (quoting
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,379 (1821)).
26. Jd. While it is true that the Court did rely on case law reported after statutory federal
question jurisdiction was created in 1875, it explicitly stated that the Osborn's characterization of a suit
arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States has been followed in many decisions of this
and other federal courts" and that "[t]he jurisdiction of this court is to be determined upon the principles
laid down in the cases referred to." ld. at 201.
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2. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson

Merrell Dow involved a state tort claim in which the plaintiff sought
to prove the defendant's negligence using a negligence per se theory. 27
The federal law in question was a drug-labeling regulation. 28 Thus, to
determine whether the defendant was negligent, the district judge needed
to determine "what a federal law means," namely the labeling
regulation. Although this question fell squarely within the rule applied
in Smith, the Supreme Court declined to find federal question
jurisdiction merited. The Court disclaimed any notion that its earlier
precedents had created "some kind of automatic test" for finding federal
jurisdiction, and instead claimed that analysis of embedded federal
question cases required a "principled [and] pragmatic" method that
could "accommodate[e] [the] . . . kaleidoscopic situations" in which
federal issues arose in state law cases. 29
In deciding against federal jurisdiction, the Court relied on the
supposed congressional intent underlying the federal regulation at issue.
In one portion of the opinion, the Court determined that Congress
neither explicitly nor implicitly created a private right of action to allow
citizen enforcement of the labeling regulation. 30 Although the plaintiff
in Merrell Dow was relying on a state right of action, the Court deemed
the lack of a federal right of action to be an indication by Congress that
the agency regulation was not to be adjudicated in federal court;
otherwise, Congress would have created a private right of action. 31
Aside from the principle of congressional intent, the Court did little to
elucidate other guiding principles. It rejected the uniformity problems
potentially caused by allowing state courts to interpret federallaw, 32 and
27. 478 U.S. 804 (1986). Negligence per se-a doctrine that exists in most states-permits
plaintiffs to establish the defendant's breach of a standard of care merely by showing the defendant
violated a statute that it had a legal duty to obey. See DAN DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS,§ 134 at 315
(2000).
28. See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 805-06 (stating the federal law in question was the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1040).
29. !d. at 813-14 (partially quoting Justice Cardozo's statement in Gully v. First National Bank,
299U.S. 109, 117-18(1936)).
30. !d. at 810--12.
31. !d. at 814. In a sentence that would breed considerable confusion over whether a federal
right of action was a sine qua non to obtaining federal jurisdiction in embedded federal question cases,
the Court stated that "congressional determination that there should be no federal remedy for the
violation of this federal statute is tantamount to a congressional conclusion that the presence of a
claimed violation of the statute [in a state law action should not confer federal jurisdiction]." !d.
(emphasis added).
32. !d. at 816. The Court explained that, "[t]o the extent that petitioner is arguing that state use
and interpretation of the [federal statute at issue in the case] pose a threat to the order and stability of the
[statutory] regime, petitioner should be arguing, not that federal courts should be able to review and
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dismissed any notion that special circumstances (such as a novel issue of
great importance) were compelling enough to warrant jurisdiction. 33
Thus is the majority opinion in Merrell Dow. In some respects, its
holding is manifestly clear: congressional intent is crucial to determining
federal jurisdiction. 34 In one important respect, however-namely,
whether Smith was still good law-the majority opm10n was
significantly lacking. Yet when the majority opinion is viewed against
the forcefully argued dissent of Justice Brennan, its meaning becomes
clear.
Justice Brennan's view, which obviously did not prevail, was that
federal question jurisdiction should obtain where "federal law [is] an
essential element of a state-law claim." 35 For Brennan, a federal issue
amounts to an "essential element" if the possibility exists "that the
federal law will be incorrectly interpreted" by the state court. 36 Brennan
thus clearly favors the Smith analysis whereas the majority does not? 7
enforce state [actions involving a federal statute], but that the [federal statute] preempts state-court
jurisdiction over the issue in dispute." !d. Additionally, the Court noted that any concerns "about the
uniformity of interpretation" were "considerably mitigated by the fact that" the Supreme Court "retains
power to review the decision of a federal issue in a state cause of action." !d.
33. !d. at 817 ('"[T]he interrelation of federal and state authority and the proper management of
the federal judicial system' would be ill served by a rule that made the existence of federal-question
jurisdiction depend on the district court's case-by-case appraisal of the novelty of the federal question
asserted as an element of the state tort.") (internal citation omitted) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v.
Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. I, 8 (1983)).
34. Commentators and courts, however, disputed after Merrell Dow whether the absence of a
federal cause of action was alone fatal to federal jurisdiction, or merely militated against jurisdiction.
Compare ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 273 (2d ed. 1994) ("Therefore, without a
federal cause of action, a federal law cannot be the basis for federal question jurisdiction.") and Carlos
Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1082, 1146
n.267 (1992) (claiming that, under Merrell Dow, "federal jurisdiction may not exist under that statute if
the federal law establishing the primary right is not enforceable through a federal right of action") with
City of Huntsville v. City of Madison, 24 F.3d 169, 174 (II th Cir. 1994) ("We conclude that it will be
only the exceptional federal statute that does not provide for a private remedy but still raises a federal
question substantial enough to confer federal question jurisdiction when it is an element of a state cause
of action.") andW. 14th St. Commercial Corp. v. 5 W. 14th Owners Corp., 815 F.2d 188, 193 (2d Cir.
1987) ("To determine whether the court has federal question jurisdiction to decide the case, the
complaint must contain either a federal cause of action or a state cause of action embodying a substantial
federal question.").
35. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 828.
36. /d.
37. The majority's disenchantment with Smith is further revealed by its almost total failure to
even acknowledge the case. The majority opinion in Merrell Dow cites Smith three times, two times of
which are in footnotes. The first citation (which is in the text) merely refers to Smith as the case on
which the district court relied in deciding the case. !d. at 806. Elsewhere, Smith is cited to explain its
consonance with a Smith-era case that was long thought to contradict it, and to note in passing that Smith
was the "most frequently cited case for" the notion that federal jurisdiction should exist where a state
case "turn[s] on some construction of federal law." !d. at 804,814 nn.5, 12.
On this issue as well, the meaning of the majority's opinion is further revealed by comparison with
the dissent. Justice Brennan not only cites the case heavily, but actually begins his analysis with it,
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One thing is clear after Merrell Dow: Smith is-at least in some
important sense-no longer good law. But then came Grable & Sons.
3. Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg.

Grable & Sons involved a state quiet title action. 38 Several years
before filing his suit, the plaintiff had defaulted on his federal income
taxes. As a consequence, the IRS seized his property and sold it at
auction. Before selling the property, the IRS was required under federal
law to give notice of the sale to the plaintiff by "giv[ing it] to the owner
of the property [or] le[ aving it] at his usual place of abode or
business." 39 The IRS attempted to fulfill its duty to notify the plaintiff
by sending him a certified letter. Though the plaintiff received the letter
and had notice of the sale, he did not object to it at that time. Years
later, however, he came to believe that the IRS was required to serve
him personally, rather than through the mail. Accordingly, he filed a
quiet title action in state court alleging that the current owner of the
property (who purchased the property at the tax sale) did not have clean
title because the sale process was flawed. The defendant removed the
case to federal court and the plaintiff moved the court to remand the case
to state court. The district court denied the plaintiffs motion and the
Sixth Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to resolve a split within the
Courts of Appeals on whether Merrell Dow ... always requires a federal
cause of action as a condition for exercising federal question
jurisdiction."40 The Court shunned a "'single, precise, all-embracing'
test for jurisdiction over federal issues embedded in state-law claims
between nondiverse parties" and held that Merrell Dow does not require
a federal cause of action. 41 Rather, the existence of a federal cause of
action for the embedded federal law is merely one issue that ought to be
considered among a "welter of issues regarding the interrelation of
federal and state authority and the proper management of the federal
judicial system."42 The Court stated the proper inquiry as follows: "does
explaining that "[t]he continuing vitality of Smith is beyond challenge," especially given its affirmance
"most recently just three Terms ago by a unanimous Court in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction
Laborers Vacation Trust." !d. at 820 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Brennan went
on to list numerous other cases in the Supreme and circuit courts applying Smith. !d. at 820-21.
38. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363 (2005).
39. !d. at 2366 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 6335(a)).
40. !d. (full case name and citation omitted).
41. !d. at 2368 (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp. 486 U.S. 800, 821 (1988)
(Stevens, J. concurring).
42. !d. (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463
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a state-law claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually
disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without
disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state
judicial responsibilities."43
Applying this test, the Court held that federal jurisdiction was
The Court found that the issue was
appropriate in this case.
"substantial" (though it did not use that word) 44 because "[t]he
Government ... has a direct interest in the availability of a federal
forum to vindicate its own administrative action, and buyers (as well as
tax delinquents) may find it valuable to come before judges used to
federal tax matters."45 Finally, dealing with the "welter of issues"
attendant upon federal-state relations, the Court noted that, "because it
will be the rare state title case that raises a contested matter of federal
law, federal jurisdiction to resolve genuine disagreement over federal tax
title provisions will portend only a microscopic effect on the federalstate division oflabor.'>'~ 6
The most notable aspect of Grable & Sons is the Court's strong
penchant for a pragmatic test. Over and over again, the Court stressed
the need for a "'common-sense accommodation of judgment to [the]
kaleidoscopic situations' that present a federal issue."47 Thus, the Court
dedicated an entire section of its opinion to explaining how Merrell
Dow--despite the clear import of the opinion's language in various
places48--did not contain any bright-line rule. Rather, the Court
explained that Merrell Dow held that "determinations about federal
jurisdiction require sensitive judgments about congressional intent,
judicial power, and the federal system.'>'~ 9 The point here is not whether
the Court was disingenuous in its reading of Merrell Dow, but rather that
Merrell Dow lent itself to several varying (and reasonable)
interpretations50 and that the Court's reading of the case should be seen
U.S. I, 8 (1983)).
43. !d.
44. Elsewhere in the opinion, the Court explained that a "substantial" interest is one implicating
a "serious federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum." !d. at
2367.
45. !d. at 2368.
46. !d.
47. !d. at 2367 (quoting Gully v. Nat'! Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1936)).
48. See Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 (1986) ("[T]he congressional
determination that there should be no federal remedy for the violation of this federal statute is
tantamount to a congressional conclusion that the presence of a claimed violation of the statute as an
element of a state cause of action is insufficiently "substantial" to confer federal question jurisdiction."
(emphasis added)).
49. !d. at 810.
50. Courts and commentators have disagreed on the meaning of Merrell Dow's ambiguous
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as a choice between such interpretations. Therefore, the Court's
selection of a flexible, pragmatic test over a bright-line rule evidences its
strong preference for the former over the latter.
Given this strong preference for a flexible test, the Court imbued
surprisingly little content in the test. For an analysis the Court describes
as "principled [and] pragmatic," 51 the Court elucidated very few
principles and did little to describe its notion of pragmatism. For
instance, the only guidance the Court offered for identifying a
"substantial" federal question is to inquire whether the resolution of the
question would benefit from "the advantages thought to be inherent in a
federal forum" 52 such as, in this case, having the question resolved by
"judges used to federal tax matters."53 And with regard to the "welter of
issues regarding the interrelation of federal and state authority,"54 the
Court discussed only a single issue: whether federal jurisdiction will
affect the "federal-state division of labor."55 Concluding that federal
jurisdiction in quiet-title actions "will portend only a microscopic effect"
on the division of labor, the Court found jurisdiction appropriate. 56
Thus, while Grable & Sons appears to solve one problem-whether a
federal cause of action is required for federal jurisdiction-it has
nonetheless created a new problem-how to assess the substantiality of
a federal law. The following Section analyzes hybrid law cases in detail
to discern whether the cases are amenable to such an open-ended
analysis.
B. Substantiality Analysis in the Lower Courts

The conventional wisdom is that embedded federal questions make up
a "remarkably tangled comer of the law" 57 that might well render a
judge "lost in a maze." 58 Yet few jurists or commentators have ventured
into the tangled comer to study and explain it in detail. 59 Such an
holding. See supra note 34.
51. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 813.
52. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2367.
53. /d. at 2368.
54. /d. at 2367.
55. /d. at 2368.
56. /d.
57. Almond v. Capital Props., Inc., 212 F.3d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 2000); see also T.B. Harms v.
Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.) (noting that federal question inquiry is a
"treacherous area").
58. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1936).
59. The most recent scholarly effort to untangle the law in this area was Note, Mr. Smith Goes to
Federal Court: Federal Question Jurisdiction Over State Law Claims Post-Merrell Dow, 115 HARV. L.
REv. 2272 (2002). While other commentators have addressed the issue over the years, see Oakley,
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endeavor is necessary if one expects to untangle the thicket-or assess
whether the Supreme Court's latest effort is likely to do so. Before
solving the problem, in other words, one must know its nature. This
Section therefore seeks to describe (1) hybrid law cases as they
commonly arise, (2) the federal law commonly involved in the cases,
(3) the degree of federal law interpretation often required by the cases,
(4) the reversal rate of district court jurisdiction decisions, (5) the rate of
federal remand to state courts and (6) the rate of post-remand state court
opinions on federal questions.
Before presenting this information, a word is in order about the cases
selected for this analysis. The universe of cases researched for this
Article consists of almost every60 circuit court decision dealing with the
issue published after July 8, 1986-the date when Merrell Dow was
issued. I defined the "issue" as whether a federal question in a state
right of action was "substantial" such that federal jurisdiction should
obtain over the state action. Notably, this definition leaves to the side
three common issues that often appear in jurisdictional discussions in
hybrid claim cases. 61
1. The Context In Which of the Federal Question Appears

Federal law in hybrid law cases generally appear~ in one of three
contexts. First, in 16% of the hybrid law cases studied, federal law
appeared as part of a state statute. For example, in a California case, a
plaintiff brought suit for disability discrimination. Under a California
statute, the disabled are protected from certain types of discrimination
and are guaranteed "full and equal access" to various facilities. 62 In
defining the term "full and equal access," the statute provides as follows:
"'Full and equal access,' for purposes of this section in its application to
transportation, means access that meets the standards of Titles II and III

supra note 22, at 1839-43; Miller, supra note 23, at 1786-93; Linda R. Hirshman, Whose Law is It,
Anyway? A Reconsideration of Federal Question Jurisdiction over Cases of Mixed State and Federal
Law, 60 IND. L.J. 17 (1985), no one has delved deeply into the lower court cases to determine their
actual nature. Instead, commentators have generally confined themselves to analyses of Supreme Court
precedent and related theoretical considerations
60. I say "almost every" because it is perhaps impossible to locate every opinion dealing with the
issue. I located these opinions by searching the Westlaw database. More specifically, I shepardized
Smith and Merrell Dow and then read each published circuit court opinion to see if the case was a hybrid
law case involving a substantiality determination.
61. These issues are (I) whether the federal question is "necessary" to the plaintiffs state law
case, (2) whether the federal issue arises as a defense rather than in the plaintiffs complaint, and (3)
whether that state cause action is completely preempted by federal law. See supra notes 21-23.
62. CAL. C!V. CODE§ 54.1 (2006).
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of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336)."63
In this case, therefore, a court was called on to determine the meaning of
the federal Americans with Disabilities Act. 64
A second context in which federal law arises-comprising some 45%
of the cases studied-is in a private contract. For example, in one case
two parties entered into a contract for the use of a rail line. The contract
explicitly required one party to satisfy certain operational requirements
mandated by federal law. One issue in the case was whether the party
had complied with these federal mandates as required by the contract.
When called upon to decide this issue, therefore, a court necessarily had
to refer to federallaw. 65
In contrast to this type of case, where federal law is explicitly made a
part of the contract, other cases involve contracts where, because the
subject of the contract is regulated by federal law, federal law is
implicitly a part of the contract. For example, in one case, a company
purchased the right to a certain amount of energy output from a power
plant. When the power plant sold several million dollars worth of
"pollution credits" pursuant to federal regulations, the company that was
buying the energy output sought a share of the proceeds from the credit
sale. Because federal law assigns pollution credits to the "owner" of a
power plant, the court in this case was called upon to determine if the
parties' contract rendered the company a part "owner" of the power
plant. Therefore, reference to federal law was required. 66
Sometimes, however, a federal law is implicated not explicitly (as in
the railroad case) or implicitly (as in the power plant case), but only
tangentially. For example, in one case a provider of telecommunications
services sued a buyer for breach of contract, alleging that the buyer
failed to pay for services rendered. Because federal law requires
telecommunications providers to file their rates with the Federal
Communications Commission, the court in that case had to refer to these
rates in determining if the buyer had failed to pay. 67 Other cases where
federal law is only tangentially related to the contract include suits
where federal law generally regulates the field to which the contract
pertains, but does not specifically address the duties inherent in the

63. !d. at§ 54.1(a)(3).
64. This example is borrowed from Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858--60 (9th Cir. 2002) (suit
under state discrimination statute required reference to Americans with Disabilities Act because state
statute adopted certain ADA provisions verbatim).
65. Mich. S. R.R. Co. v. Branch & St. Joseph Counties Rail Users Ass'n, Inc., 287 F.3d 568,
573-74 (6th Cir. 2002).
66. Orrnet Corp. v. Ohio Power Co., 98 F.3d 799, 806--07 (4th Cir. 1998).
67. W. Union Intern., Inc. v. Data Dev., Inc., 41 F.3d 1494, 1495-96 (lith Cir. 1995).
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contract. 68
The third and final context in which federal questions appear in
hybrid law cases is as an element of the action. Comprising about 39%
of the hybrid law cases studied, these cases often appear as tort actions
where the federal law defines a standard of care to be observed. For
example, in a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff argued that his
prior prosecution under the federal RICO statute was unwarranted
because the statute could not be construed as prohibiting his alleged
actions. Thus, a court called upon to assess this claim had to determine
the meaning of the RICO provision at issue. 69 Other examples where
federal law acted as a standard of care include professional malpractice
claims where the defendant failed to follow federal law in discharging
his or her duties/ 0 trespass claims where federal law controls the right of
access to the land/ 1 negligence claims where federal law formed the
basis of a negligence per se theory, 72 and claims against decisionmakers
alleging that the decisionmakers incorrectly applied federal law. 73 Still
other claims implicate federal law in ways difficult to categorize. 74
Viewing as a whole the contexts in which federal law arises in hybrid
law cases, one is struck by the fact that in only 16% of the cases is
federal law relied upon to accomplish the same policy goals it was
intended to accomplish. In 84% of the cases, on the other hand, federal

68. See, e.g., Interstate Petrol. Corp. v. Morgan, 228 F.3d 331,335 (4th Cir. 2000) (suit alleging
breach of gas station franchise agreement required reference to Petroleum Marketing Practices Act
because certain franchising agreements are regulated by the Act).
69. Berg v. Leason, 32 F.3d 422, 424-26 (9th Cir. 1994).
70. See, e.g., Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156, 1168--69 (4th Cir. 1996).
71. See, e.g., Heydon v. MediaOne of Se. Mich., Inc., 327 F.3d 466, 471-72 (6th Cir. 2003)
(trespass action against cable company required reference to federal Cable Act in order to determine
whether company had authority to trespass); Nicodemus v. Union Pac. Co., 440 F.3d 1227, 1235-37
(lOth Cir. 2006) (en bane) (trespass and unjust enrichment action against railroad company required
reference to federal land grant laws in order to determine scope of railroad rights under grants).
72. Although Merrell Dow focused on this type of case, these cases appear to be rather rare
(perhaps because of the Merrell Dow holding). Only two such cases have been published by a circuit
court since 1987. See Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chern. Co., Inc., 29 F.3d 148, 151-54 (4th Cir.
1995) (personal injury suit required reference to federal environmental regulations because plaintiff
sought to rely on defendant's violation of regulation asperse evidence of negligence); Clark v. Velsicol
Chern. Corp., 944 F.2d 196, 197-199 (4th Cir. 1991) (personal injury suit required reference to federal
environmental regulations because plaintiff sought to rely on defendant's violation of regulation as per
se evidence of negligence).
73. See, e.g., Metheny v. Becker, 352 F.3d 458, 460--61 (1st Cir. 2003) (suit against local zoning
board alleging erroneous decision by board required reference to the federal Telecommunications Act
because Act allegedly dictated board's decision).
74. See, e.g., D'Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 258 F.3d 93, 99-104 (2d Cir. 2001) (injurious
falsehood claims against New York Stock Exchange for banning plaintiff from trading on exchange
required reference to federal securities laws because laws controlled Exchange's obligations to it
members).
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law is used as a tool to vindicate policies different from the federal law
itself. Thus, in the RICO case mentioned above, the RICO statute is not
used to fight racketeering and corruption, as Congress originally
intended, but to vindicate the policies furthered by malicious prosecution
actions. Similarly, in the pollution credit cases discussed above, federal
environmental law is not relied on to pursue environmental goals, but
rather for the goal of pure financial gain (whether warranted or not). 75
Thus, notably, in the great majority of hybrid law cases, the vindication
of federal law serves very few of the regulatory ends for which the
federal law was adopted.
2. The Federal Laws Appearing in Hybrid Law Cases
Although a broad variety of federal laws appears in hybrid law cases,
some generalizations are possible. First, only 7% of the cases (5 of 67)
sought vindication of the plaintiffs' federal civil rights. 76 Many casesapproximately 20-30%-involve major federal regulatory statutes, such
as the Telecommunications Act, the Cable Act, or intellectual property
laws. 77 At times, the federal law in the hybrid case is a "law" in word

75. It may be argued, perhaps, that one seeking to vindicate a contractual right premised on
adherence to federal law may further the policy goals of the federal law. A party found liable for
violating federal law-even in a breach of contract context-will be less likely to violate that federal in
the future, thus serving the ends of the statute. While this may be true in some cases (such as in the
farmer/landowner example presented above, see supra text accompanying note 20), it is certainly not
true in many other contract cases. For example, in the pollution credit case (see supra text
accompanying note 66), the dispute involved ownership of pollution credits, which is an issue somewhat
attenuated from the goals of the statute itself. Of course, one might argue that ownership issues are core
to the operation of the statute (because the statute permits the sale of such credits and ownership rights
are a necessity for market forces to work). Yet, even if this argument is correct in theory, the entire
endeavor is weakened by the principle of efficient breach. Under this principle, parties often breach
contracts regardless of the ensuing damages because the breach will permit greater gains in a separate
transaction. Thus, private contracts are a poor vehicle for enforcing federal law. See RICHARD A
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, § 4.9 at 120 (6th ed. 2003).
76. Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 816--19 (4th Cir. 2004); Bracey v. Bd. of Educ.
of City of Bridgeport, 368 F.3d 108, 113-16 (2nd Cir. 2004); Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858--60
(9th Cir. 2002); Jairath v. Dyer, 154 F.3d 1280, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 1998); Utley v. Varian Assocs., Inc.,
811 F.2d 1279, 1282-83 (9th Cir. 1987).
Although four additional cases involved federal civil rights laws, the suits did not seek the vindication of
civil rights per se, but rather sought the vindication of private law rights, such as contract or tort. See
Morris v. City of Hobart, 39 F.3d 1105, 1111-12 (lOth Cir. 1994); Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey &
Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 550-51 (8th Cir. 1996); Diaz v. Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502, 1505-06 (lith Cir.
1996); Carpenter v. Wichita Sch. Dist., 44 F.3d 362, 366--68 (5th Cir. 1995). For an explanation of why
the context in which the federal law arises is important, see supra text accompanying note 75.
77. It is difficult to classifY the cases according to the nature of the federal regulatory program
implicated. Sometimes the cases squarely present important questions of federal regulatory programs.
See, e.g, City of Rome, N.Y. v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 362 F.3d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir. 2004) (suit
alleging breach of duty to re-negotiate telecommunications contract required reference to federal
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only. For example, some suits sought to enforce consent decrees entered
pursuant to federal law (whether in a federal court or agency). 78
Similarly, other cases relied on tariffs that, when filed with the
appropriate agency, were imbued with the force offederallaw. 79
3. The Degree of Reference to Federal Law
Regardless of the federal law involved, or the context in which it
arises, all hybrid law cases involve at least some interpretation of federal
law. 80 Yet the amount of interpretation involved varies greatly between
cases. In approximately 52% of the cases, for example, federal law is
not interpreted in any significant or meaningful way. In one such case, a
plaintiff brought suit under a state statute prohibiting the dispensation of
certain drugs without a prescription. The statute did not list any
particular drug for which dispensation was prohibited, but instead
incorporated by reference the drugs listed in a federal drug schedule.
Thus, to determine whether the state statute was violated, the court in
this case had to verify that drug involved in the case was in fact listed in
the particular federal drug schedule. 81 Obviously, referring to a drug
schedule requires no interpretation and only the barest of application. 82
Even less demanding of the court's interpretational skills are cases
that simply call for an acknowledgment of federal law. For example, in
a suit over a licensing agreement between a Native American tribe and
the state of California, federal law was allegedly involved simply
because the contract was entered into pursuant to authority conferred by
the Indian Gaming Act, but interpreting the federal law was not essential

Telecommunications Act because statute regulated re-negotiation duties). At other times, however, the
cases involve federal regulatory programs but do not implicate any core regulatory policies. See, e.g.,
W. Union Intern., Inc. v. Data Dev., Inc., 41 F.3d 1494, 1495-96 (lith Cir. 1995) (suit alleging failure
to pay for services rendered by telecommunications required reference to federal Telecommunications
Act because rates charged for services are regulated by tariffs filed pursuant to Act).
78. See, e.g., Morris v. City of Hobart, 39 F.3d 1105, 1111-12 (lOth Cir. 1994).
79. See, e.g., W. Union Intern., Inc., 41 F.3d at 1495-96.
80. As explained above, if federal Jaw need not be interpreted to resolve the case, dismissal is
appropriate under Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 ( 1988). See supra note
22.
81. Bailey v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 965,968 (6th Cir. 1995) (refusing federal jurisdiction).
82. Other examples include Dunlap v. G&L Holding Group, Inc., 381 F.3d 1285, 1291-93 (I lth
Cir. 2004) (a breach of contract action in which one party sought to establish the validity of a contract;
because federal banking regulations required the contract to be in writing, the court had to determine if
the contract was indeed in writing) and Mich. S. R.R. Co. v. Branch & St. Joseph Counties Rail Users
Assoc., Inc., 287 F.3d 568, 573-74 (6th Cir. 2002) (breach of contract suit for use of railroad where
contract required one party to obtain certificates of operation from a federal agency; the court thus had
to determine if the certificates had been properly procured).
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for determining the outcome of the claim. 83 Several other cases involve
federal law that plays a similarly thin role. 84
Contrary to cases requiring insignificant amounts of interpretation,
many hybrid law cases do demand courts interpret and apply federal law
in significant ways. 85 For example, in a business disparagement action,
a plaintiff alleged that the defendant falsely (and publicly) accused it of
selling a product for which it did not own the patent. Thus, the court
was called upon to determine the rightful owner of the patent-a
question that is controlled by federallaw. 86 While other such cases are
not uncommon, 87 some cases, while involving interpretation of federal
law, do not demand an interpretation as rigorous as might be required in
a non-hybrid law suit. For example, in a case seeking to reverse an
arbitration award, a plaintiff alleged that the arbitrator's interpretation of
federal law was grossly negligent. The court presented with this case
was thus called upon not to determine exactly what federal law said, but
simply whether the arbitrator's interpretation was grossly wrong. 88
While these cases are not especially numerous, they do comprise
83. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 1997).
84. See, e.g., Greenblatt v. Delta Plumbing & Heating Corp., 68 F.3d 561, 570-71 (2d Cir. 1995)
(suit to enforce a collective bargaining agreement involved federal law because collective bargaining
agreements are creations of federal law); Milan Express Co., Inc. v. W. Surety Co., 886 F.2d 783, 78689 (6th Cir. 1989) (a suit by motor carrier alleging breach of shipping contract; although the Interstate
Commerce Act regulated many aspects of shipping contracts, the plaintiff did not allege violation of
federal law); Virgin Is. Hous. Auth. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 27 F.3d 911, 916 (3rd Cir. 1994) (a
breach of contract suit related to a contract for the construction of public housing; although HUD
regulations addressed many public housing issues, the plaintiff did not allege the violation of any
regulation).
Because federal law is simply present in these cases, and not requiring of interpretation, these cases
should arguably be dismissed under the "necessity analysis" explained in Christianson v. Colt Industries
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988). See supra note 22. One might argue, therefore, that these cases
do not involve a "substantiality analysis" and should therefore be excluded from this study. Notably,
however, in each case of this sort, the court purports to engage in a substantiality analysis. Thus, these
cases-although misguided in their analysis-illustrate the nature of substantiality analysis as it is
understood and undertaken by federal courts. As that is the central task of this study, I deem it
appropriate to include the cases.
85. The number of cases requiring significant interpretation is 32 of 67, or 48 percent. For a
specific listing of these cases, see the Appendix at the end of this Article.
86. Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. FlowData, Inc., 986 F.2d 476, 477-79 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (finding federal jurisdiction warranted).
87. See, e.g., Clark v. Velsicol Chern. Corp., 944 F.2d 196, 197-199 (4th Cir. 1991) (a personal
injury action where the plaintiff sought to establish the defendant's negligence under a negligence per se
theory; thus the court was called upon to determine whether the defendant violated an EPA regulation);
City of Rome, N.Y. v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 362 F.3d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir. 2004) (a breach of
contract suit where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached its duty to re-negotiate a
telecommunications contract; because re-negotiation duties are partially regulated by the federal
Telecommunications Act, the court was called upon to interpret federal law).
88. Greenberg v. Bear, Steams & Co., 220 F.3d 22, 25-27 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding federal
jurisdiction warranted).
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approximately 16% of the cases in which significant interpretation is
required. 89
4. The Reversal Rate in Hybrid Law Cases
The reversal rate for hybrid law jurisdiction decisions reflects, to
some extent at least, the incoherence of the legal doctrine. An above
average reversal rate is generally understood to indicate that the body of
law involved is not sufficiently coherent to be consistently applied by
the district courts. 9 For jurisdiction questions in hybrid law cases, the
reversal rate is 55%. 91 This is significant because the reversal rate in
civil cases (excluding habeas petitions) is 12.4%. 92 Importantly,
however, the overall reversal rate includes many cases that, on appeal,
are subject to deferential standards of review. 93 Thus, the reversal rate
on de novo questions alone is likely higher than 12.4%. While I have
not discovered any research addressing reversal rates according to

°

89. These cases total 5 in all. See Nichols v. Harbor Venture, Inc., 284 F.3d 857, 860-61 (8th
Cir. 2002). (malicious prosecution action for pursuit of previous declaratory judgment suit required
reference to a consent decree entered by a federal court because the consent decree allegedly foreclosed
the declaratory judgment suit); U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388-91 (3d Cir. 2002)
(malicious prosecution action required reference to federal maritime law because plaintiff alleged
federal law did not support defendant's claims before the court); Greenberg, 220 F.3d at 25-27 (suit to
reverse allegedly erroneous arbitration award required reference to federal law because arbitrator's
decision was predicated in part on federal law); Diaz v. Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502, 1505-06 (lith Cir.
1996) (legal malpractice claim against criminal defense attorney required reference to U.S. Supreme
Court opinion on Eighth Amendment to determine if attorney's interpretation of case was grossly
negligent); Berg v. Leason, 32 F.3d 422, 424-26 (9th Cir. 1994) (malicious prosecution action required
reference to federal RICO statute in order to determine if prosecutor had legally tenable ground for
prosecution under the law).
90. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?,
15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. I, 3 (2001) (explaining that, in a category of intellectual property cases, a
reversal rate of 33 percent is indicative of extreme doctrinal ambiguity).
91. Another study found that jurisdictional decisions in hybrid law cases were reversed 65% of
the time. See Note, supra note 59, at 2280. Because that study did not identify the cases used to
calculate the reverse rate, it is impossible to explain the discrepancy.
92. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, Mar. 31,2004,
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2004/tables/B05Mar04.pdf. This reversal rate is consistent with past
rates. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 70, tbl. 3.5 (1996).
93. For example, findings of facts are often reviewed under the deferential "abuse of discretion"
standard and arguments advanced for the first time on appeal are often reviewed under the similarly
deferential "clear error" standard. See, e.g, Cartier v. Jackson, 59 F.3d 1046, 1048 (lOth Cir.l995) ("In
reviewing a court's determination for abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the determination absent a
distinct showing it was based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact."); United States v. Mitchell, 429
F.3d 952, 961 (lOth Cir. 2005) ("Because [the defendant] did not raise this objection at the sentencing
hearing, we review for plain error."). See also Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What is Legal
Doctrine?, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 517, 519 (2006) (noting in study of legal doctrine that, "when doctrine
commanded a higher or lower level of deference to the ruling below, the circuit court's probability of
reversal corresponded with the level of deference it was to give").
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standard of review, the reversal rate on hybrid law jurisdictional
decisions is likely much higher than other cases subject to de novo
review. That the doctrine in this area is more lacking in coherence than
other areas is therefore a fair conclusion.
5. The Rate of Remand
Another interesting trait of hybrid law cases is the rate of remand.
Whether a case is first filed in state court and then removed to federal
court, or filed initially in federal court, the federal court will consider
either party's motion to remand the case to state court. In hybrid law
cases, the remand rate appears to be quite high. Specifically, of the 67
circuit court cases studied for this Article, 66% (44 of 67 cases) were
remanded to state court.
6. State Decision and Publication Rate
Once a case is remanded to state court, those courts must resolve the
federal question in the case. A review of the cases remanded to state
courts, however, yields little evidence that state courts are in fact
resolving the federal questions remanded to them. Of the 44 remanded
cases, not a single one resulted in a published decision interpreting
federallaw. 94
* * *
This Part began by summarizing Supreme Court doctrine in the field
of hybrid law jurisdiction. That summary concluded with Grable &
Sons, wherein the Court deliberately adopted a flexible, open-ended
approach to deciding jurisdictional questions in hybrid law cases. This
Part then turned to a detailed analysis of hybrid law cases as they
actually arise in the lower courts. This analysis is now used in the
following part to demonstrate that hybrid law jurisdictional cases are
best resolved by a bright-line rule rather than the flexible standard that
the Supreme Court has adopted.

94. For the purposes of this Article, I define a published decision as one that is available to the
public on Westlaw or Lexis/Nexis, regardless of whether the opinion is designated by the state court for
publication. My concern here is with the precedential force (or lack thereof) of state court decisions of
federal law. Although opinions not designated for publication may not normally be cited as precedent,
their availability may nonetheless exert a degree of precedential force inasmuch as the court evinces its
reasoning and preferences on the legal questions involved therein.
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Ill. RULES AND STANDARDS IN JURISDICTION OVER HYBRID LAW CASES

Just about nobody, it seems, thinks that jurisdictional rules should be
fuzzy. Justice William Brennan-no lightweight in the field of federal
jurisdiction-has espoused the near-universal view that uncertain, or as
has described them, "infinitely malleable,"95 jurisdictional rules have the
regrettable effect of allowing "[p]arties [to] . . . spend years litigating
claims only to learn that their efforts and expense were wasted in a court
that lacked jurisdiction."96 In a recent article on the allocation of cases
between state and federal courts, Professor Barry Friedman concurred,
stating that "[ o]ne ought not make a fetish of bright line rules, but they
have their place, and one place in particular is the law of jurisdiction."97
Professor Martin Redish, however, has perhaps put it most forcefully. In
a paper chastising jurisdictional rules that "resemble[] more the freestanding, subjective, and individualized determinations of Judge Wapner
than a coherent, generalizable jurisdictional doctrine," Professor Redish
stated plainly that "jurisdictional uncertainty can surely lead to both a
waste of judicial time and added expense to the litigants."98 Nor are
Brennan, Friedman and Redish alone in their distaste for jurisdictional
discretion; a large number of commentators seem to hold a similar
view. 99
Yet flexibility also has its place, as David Shapiro has forcefully
argued in his landmark article, "Jurisdiction and Discretion." According
to Professor Shapiro, "the continued exercise of discretion ... has much
95. Merrell Dow Pharrn. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 821, n.l (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
96. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)
97. Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal
and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1211, 1225 (2004) (arguing that a multijurisdictional approach is
preferable to the current approach of having cases litigated in either federal or state court).
98. Redish, supra note 21, at 1794 (criticizing "jurisdictional doctrine" as a "crazyquilt
combination of sometimes vague and cryptic statutory directives and judge-made doctrines" and
offering a principled approach based on seven normative factors affecting the appropriateness of a
particular forum).
99. See, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 313-14 (1950) ("the
boundary between judicial power and nullity should also, if possible, be a bright line, so that very little
thought is required to enable judges to keep inside of it); RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND
WESCHLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 886 (5th ed. 2003) (suggesting that the
difficult-to-apply test of Smith may be a "game" that is not "worth the candle"); LARRY W. Y ACKLE,
RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURTS 91 (1994) (lamenting Supreme Court doctrine that "needlessly
confuse[s] matters with outdated jargon and misleading generalizations" and advocating "jurisdictional
rules that can be easily applied at the outset of litigation"); Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1906 ("There
is ... [a] strong tradition ... urging that jurisdictional rules be clear."); Note, supra note 59, at 2278
(stating that there is a "particularly great need for clarity in articulating jurisdictional principles such as
the scope of the Smith doctrine.").
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to contribute to the easing of interbranch and intergovernmental
tensions." 100 Yet Professor Shapiro's penchant for discretion is often
overstated. Although he admirably defended the role of discretion in his
article, he did not argue that free-ranging discretion was the final resting
place for jurisdictional norms. Rather, he saw discretion as a means to
an end, a tool for incrementally achieving the appropriate rule. As he
explained: "Central to [my] thesis is the view that discretion need not
mean incoherence, indeterminacy, or caprice; nor is discretion at odds
with the recognition of responsibility for the adjudication of disputes.
Rather it can lead to the development of effective guidelines and, yes,
even rules." 101 Thus, even with Shapiro's commitment to the values of
discretion, a consensus exists that, in the long term, jurisdictional
guidelines should be clear. 102
Yet the underlying preference for clarity in jurisdiction has rarely
been fully articulated or analyzed in detail. Thus, the debate over
jurisdictional norms stands to benefit greatly from an analysis of the
interplay of legal substance and form. The substance of a legal
directive-such as the proper jurisdiction of federal courts-may be
either fostered or frustrated by its form. Legal forms are generally one
of two types: rules or standards, though many legal directives contain
aspects of both. Although much has been written on jurisdiction and
discretion, and a similarly large amount on rules and standards, the two
separate concepts have yet to be applied to each other.
This Part aims to do just that. It begins by defining rules and
standards, then proceeds to explain the costs of each, and finally
identifies the legal contexts in which each form would be the lowest cost
method of resolving a legal issue. The Part then employs these
observations to assess of the appropriate legal form for resolving
I 00. Shapiro, supra note 2, at 545.
I 0 I. /d. Although Shapiro recognized that a certain amount of discretion is likely unavoidable, he
nonetheless stressed that discretion "carrie[d] with it an obligation of reasoned and articulated
decision ... that can therefore exist within a regime of law." Id. at 579. Jurisdictional standards,
Shapiro explained, must be "capable of being articulated and openly applied by the courts, evaluated by
critics ofthe courts' work, and reviewed by the legislative branch." /d. at 578. Thus, even at its furthest
edges, Shapiro's position on discretion still retain a significant amount of content that would constrain
judges to a certain degree.
For a recent exegesis of Shapiro's "Jurisdiction and Discretion" article, see Meltzer, supra note 2. In
regard to discretion serving as a tool for achieving certainty in jurisdictional rules, Professor Meltzer
noted that Shapiro's theory "rests on confidence that judicial elaboration of the reasons for jurisdictional
decisions will eventually generate a body oflaw that is reasonably determinate." /d. at 1907.
I 02. The most common objection to unclear jurisdictional guidelines is the increased costs of
litigation. See, e.g., Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("Parties . . . spend years litigating claims only to learn that their efforts and expense were
wasted in a court that lacked jurisdiction."). The analysis rarely moves beyond this rather intuitive
observation, however.
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jurisdictional questions in hybrid law cases. It concludes that a rule is
preferable to a standard in such cases.

A. Rules and Standards: Definitions and Costs
"A 'rule' is a norm whose application turns on the presence of
relatively noncontentious facts, and turns on the presence of those facts
regardless [of] whether the values that the rule is designed to serve are
actually served or disserved by the particular application." 103 A
ubiquitously proffered example of a rule is a speed limit: "Drive 65." 104
The application of this norm turns only on the speed at which someone
drives; a person who drives in excess of 65 miles per hour violates the
rule; a person who drives at 65 miles per hour or less obeys the rule.
Notably, adherence to or violation of the rule does not tum on the values
behind the rule, such as safety, or circumstances not embodied in the
content of the rule, such as whether one is rushing to a hospital or
driving in poor weather. Thus, rules are often described as "'opaque"'
in the sense that they are applied without regard to the "rule's
background justifications, and '"formal"' in the sense that they are
"applied without regard to [the] substance of the results but only with
regard to the rule's terms." 105
Standards, on the other hand, "are norms that have the opposite
characteristics." 106 A directive that is standard-like cannot be applied by
its words alone, but tends to "collapse decision-making back into the
direct application of the background principle or policy to a fact
situation." 107 Thus, while a rule instructs one to "Drive 65," a standard
instructs one to "Drive safely." The "background principle" underlying
a 65 mph speed limit is safety; 108 thus instructing one to "Drive safely"
would presumably accomplish the same ends. The difference, however,
is that the standard permits "the decision-maker to take into account all
relevant factors," 109 such as treacherous road conditions, whereas the
I 03. Larry Alexander, Incomplete Theorizing: A Review Essay of Cass R. Sunstein 's Legal
Reasoning and Political Conflict, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 531,541 (1997).
104. !d.; see also, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND LIFE 136 (1991); Louis Kaplow, Rules
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 560 (1992).
I OS. Alexander, supra note 103, at 541.
106. /d.
107. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58
(1992).
l 08. There are, of course, other "background principles" that likely inform the choice of a 65 mph
speed limit, such as fuel conservation or road maintenance costs. For the purposes of brevity and clarity,
however, only the principle of safety is used here.
109. See Sullivan, supra note 107, at 59. It is important to note at this juncture that the term
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rule does not.
Because of the differing nature of rules and standards, they each
impose different costs when used. These costs have been studied in
detail by numerous commentators, who widely agree as to the relative
costs of each legal form. 110 Accordingly, a detailed tracing of each type
and manner of cost incurred is unnecessary; instead, a listing and
weighing of the relative costs is sufficient for the purposes of this
Article. Thus, relative to standards, 111 rules are costly to promulgate, 112
"decisionmaker" in the rules/standards scholarship is usually understood to simultaneously refer to two
different entities. One is the regulated entity (the driver of a car) and the other is the enforcement entity
(a traffic court judge). Both entities must determine for their own purposes (whether driving home from
the store, or resolving traffic disputes) the meaning of a legal norm. Such a determination must be made
whether the norm is a rule ("Drive 65") or a standard ("Drive safely"). "Drive 65" strongly constrains
both the driver and the judge in deciding the appropriate speed whereas "Drive safely" permits both
entities more leeway in determining the appropriate speed. See SCHAUER, supra note 104, at 138 (noting
the "two types of decision-maker," one of which is the "rule-enforcer" and other of which is the
"primary addressee of the rule").
110. For the leading discussions of the relative costs of rules and standards, see generally
SCHAUER, supra note I 04; Kaplow, supra note I04; Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law of Rules,
56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989); Sullivan, supra note I 07; Sunstein, supra note 5; Russell B. Korobkin,
Behavior Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REv. 23 (2000).
Some commentators contend that analyzing legal forms only according to their costs overlooks other
important attributes of each, such as their association with different political philosophies or notions of
individual rights. For example, in a landmark article examining rules and standards, Duncan Kennedy
argued that particular strains of political ideology (such as altruism or individuality) lead us to prefer one
type of legal form over the other (such as standards to further altruism, and rules to further
individuality). Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Acljudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685 (1976). Although the insights of Professor Kennedy and others advancing non-economic
perspectives on the issue are valuable to our understanding of legal form, they contribute comparatively
little to the specific issue addressed in this Article. This is because § 1331 and the case law interpreting
it do not regulate primary conduct, but rather regulate the forum for resolving disputes over primary
conduct. For example, jurisdictional rules do not define one's right to use his or her private property,
but do determine in which court one may seek redress for an infringement of that right. Thus, arguments
premised on democracy and individuality (among others) carry substantially less weight in the
jurisdictional context.
One might reply, however, that federal jurisdiction is often a dispositive factor in the vindication of a
substantive right. If one buys the claim of Professor Burt Neubome and others that federal judges are
more likely to be more solicitous of civil rights claims than state judges, the choice of forum is likely to
be quite important. See Burt Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977). Yet, in the
particular case of embedded federal questions, this argument carries little force. Of the 67 circuit court
opinions published since 1986 reviewed for this Article, only five sought the vindication of a federal
civil right. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79. Thus, civil rights claims comprise only a small
portion of the issues present in embedded federal question cases.
Ill. Because it is only possible here to speak of the costs of rules and standards in relative terms,
one could easily rephrase this description of costs with a primary focus on standards. Thus, relative to
rules, standards are cheap to promulgate, costly to apply and costly to research. Standards also have
lower costs of regulatory failure, higher costs of adjudicatory failure and higher costs of primary actor
failure.
112. Promulgation costs are the costs of creating a rule or standard. For example, when a
legislature wishes to use a rule to control the speed at which individuals drive, it would likely perform a
detailed-and costly--evaluation of each of several background factors (such as traffic flow, safety and
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cheap to apply 113 and cheap to ascertain. 114 Rules also have higher costs
of regulatory failure, 115 lower costs of adjudicatory failure 116 and lower
costs of primary actor failure. 117
This cost structure makes possible the identification of the situations
in which rules would be preferable to standards and vice versa. This
Part now turns to the issue of making those identifications.

B. Rules and Standards: Preferable Uses
Given their differing natures, rules and standards are each fit for
different situations. As explained below, the appropriateness of a rule or
standard in a given situation hinges on (1) the frequency with which a
legal question arises, (2) the homogeneity of the questions arising and
(3) the resources of the actor making the decision.
1. Frequency
Because rules involve higher promulgation costs than standards, rules
are preferable to standards in situations where a particular legal question
will arise frequently. High-frequency legal questions allow the high
promulgation costs of rules to be fully amortized over the life of the
rule's application. Each ex ante application of a rule by the rule's
addressee and ex post application of a rule by a judge will require less
pollution) to choose the optimum speed for any given road. See Kaplow, supra note 104, at 579-80;
Korobkin, supra note 110, at 31-34.
113. Application costs are the costs of applying the rule or standard. One a rule is set defining the
speed limit, for example, drivers, police officers and judges can easily-and cheaply-apply the rule.
See Alexander, supra note I 03, at 542; Kaplow, supra note I 04, at 581.
114. Research costs are the costs that litigants will spend to determine the content of a rule or
standard. For example, a speed limit set by a rule can be discerned quite cheaply (e.g., by merely
looking at the road sign) as compared to discerning a speed limit set by a standard. See Kaplow, supra
note I 04, at 571.
115. Regulatory failure costs are the costs imposed by a rule that is inartfully drafted. For
example, the United States voting age is set at 18-years-old, even though there are many 17 -year-olds
who are mature and educated enough to participate in government and there are many 19-year-olds who
lack the necessary maturity and education. Thus, the voting age "rule" gets it wrong sometimes. A
standard, on the other hand, would likely have a lower rate of over- and under-inclusion (though its cost
of administration in this example would be extremely high). On the subject of regulatory error, see
Sunstein, supra note 5, at 992-93; Korobkin, supra note 110, at 36; Alexander, supra note 103, at 542.
116. Adjudicatory failure costs are the costs incurred when a judge improperly applies a rule or
standard. Rules, because they give judges less discretion than standards, are less frequently misapplied
than standards. See Alexander, supra note 103, at 542-43; Korobkin, supra note 110, at 38-39.
117. Primary actor costs are the costs incurred when a primary actor fails to apply the rule
appropriately. For example, in the case of speed limits, primary actor failure occurs when the driver
chooses an improper speed to drive. Because rules give the primary actor less discretion, primary actor
costs are less with rules. See Korobkin, supra note II 0, at 36-38.
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effort compared to a standard, making the rule, over the long term,
preferable to the standard. 118
Again, the speed limit example is illustrative. Hundreds of millions
of Americans drive cars every day. Determining the appropriate speed
for each stretch of road obviously involves higher up-front costs than
simply determining that individuals should "drive reasonably." But the
sheer volume of decisions on speed-both ex ante by drivers ex post by
police officers and judges-makes rule preferable to standards. 119 While
the costs of setting an exact speed limit will initially be higher than
adopting a reasonableness standard, the extra effort required by every
driver and judge in determining the appropriate speed on their own will,
over time, far exceed the up-front costs exacted by the creation of a rule.
Importantly, inasmuch as the cost of promulgating a rule approaches
that of promulgating a standard, the frequency of a legal question
becomes less important. The reverse is also true; to the extent that rulepromulgation costs greatly exceed standard-promulgation costs, the
frequency of the legal question becomes centrally important. To
illustrate, consider a legislative body charged with determining on which
side of the road motorists should drive. The body could adopt either a
rule (drive on the right side) or a standard (drive on the side reasonable
under the circumstances). Adopting a rule in this case would cost
scarcely more, if any, than adopting a standard. Thus, the frequency
would take on lesser importance in the choice of legal form. On the
other hand, in a situation where a rule would be substantially more
costly to promulgate than a standard, such as in antitrust law, for
example, where something akin to a standard has been chosen, 120 the ex
post frequency of the legal question takes on exceeding importance.

118. Korobkin, supra note 110, at 33.
119. Other examples analogous to speed limits are easy to imagine. In the case of welfare
entitlements, "[i]t is very hard, for example to decide who is poor, and who, among the class of poor is
entitled to what. It would be particularly hard to decide who is poor through case-by-case judgments
based on analogy, and even harder to make decisions about appropriate social entitlements in that
fashion." CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 97 (1996). Similarly, in the
case of taxes, it would be wholly unworkable to have citizens and companies pay a "fair share" of taxes
according to the government benefits received. See Alexander, supra note I 03, at 543 (noting the tax
example); Kaplow, supra note 104, at 573 (same). For a study of rules and standards in the tax field, see
James W. Colliton, Standards, Rules and the Decline of the Courts in the Law of Taxation, 99 DICK. L.
REv. 265, 322-23 (1995) (explaining that tax law is generally dominated by rules but that standards
apply in rare circumstances where the regulated activity is diverse, such as capital expenditures).
120. See 15 U.S.C. § I (2006) (prohibiting contracts in restraint of trade); see also Scalia, supra
note II 0, at 1183 (noting that "[ o]ne can hardly imagine a prescription more vague than the Sherman
Act's prohibition of contracts ... in restraint of trade").

2006]

HYBRID LAW CASES

173

2. Homogeneity
Because rules are inflexible, they are best fit for situations in which
the legal issue in question arises in much the same way each time.
Where the legal issues arise differently each time, h9wever, standards
are often preferable.
Using the speed limit example, decisions about how fast one should
travel, whether made by the driver or a judge, generally involve the
same fact each time: a car, a road and a person driving to some
destination.
Accordingly, applying a rule will generate fewer
adjudication and primary-actor failures. 121 Of course, some regulatory
failures are inevitable, such as when one is driving to the hospital in an
emergency. But these cases are rare in the universe of driving situations.
The speed limit example, however, contrasts with another highfrequency legal question: negligence cases. 122 While negligence suits
arise regularly, thus suggesting that a rule might be preferable, the
extraordinary variety of situations in which negligence arises-ranging
from professional malpractice to car accidents to infliction of emotional
distress-makes a rule inappropriate because it would generate huge
error costs. Any attempt to reduce the multitude of appropriate
behaviors we expect of each other to a specific rule or set of rules would
certainly fail to account for the innumerable nuances that we all find
relevant in determining how to behave. Thus, a rule in negligence cases
would necessarily be broadly under- and over-inclusive, resulting in
large costs of regulatory failure. Accordingly, even though negligence
cases arise with high frequency, the heterogeneous circumstances from
which they arise merit a "reasonable person" standard instead of brightline rule.
3. Resources of Decisionmakers
Where decisionmakers-including primary actors and adjudicatorsare unlikely to expend sufficient resources to apply standards, which
take more effort to apply than rules, rules are preferable. Without the
expenditure of sufficient resources, primary actors and judges are more
likely to resolve legal questions incorrectly, resulting in higher error
costs.

121. This assumes, of course, that the rule was properly calibrated at the time it was promulgated.
That issue, however, is not relevant to a consideration of homogeneity (or heterogeneity) dictated by the
structure of error costs in rules and standards.
122. See Alexander, supra note 103, at 542 (noting that "[p]erhaps 'act as would a reasonable
person' is the closest we get to a pure standard").
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Before explaining this point in further detail, a couple clarifications
are in order. The term "resources" in this Article refers to anything
available to the decisionmaker that would assist her in resolving a
dispute. Perhaps the most primary resource for any decisionmaker is his
or her analytical ability. Without sufficient knowledge and intellect,
decisionmakers will not be able to resolve legal questions. 123 Other
resources include the time available to the decisionmaker to resolve the
question and any personnel, such as a lawyer or clerk, upon which the
decisionmaker may rely during the process. Another important resource
is money. A primary actor with little disposable income is less likely to
invest in determining the content of a standard than a rule. 124 Similarly,
inasmuch as we, as a society, employ judges to resolve legal questions
through standards, which require more time to apply, we will be
required to hire more judges or pay them more. 125
One further clarification is in order. As stated above, rules are
appropriate where "decision makers are unlikely to expend sufficient
resources." Two situations make this scenario likely. The first is where
the resources are simply unavailable. The second occurs when the
resources are available but the decisionmaker is unwilling to expend
them because the marginal gains from the expenditure do not exceed the
marginal costs. In the case of a primary actor, this concept is relatively
simple to grasp. No company is likely to spend $5,000 on legal advice
in order to avoid a possible $1,000 fine, assuming the fine is the total
cost ofthe infraction. In the case of judges, however, the concept is a bit
more elusive. Judges' main costs of deciding cases are time and
analytical effort. The gains from deciding a case correctly are a bit more
difficult to ascertain, but clearly involve aspects of personal fulfillment
in deciding a case appropriately and fear of reversal by a higher court
(which is essentially inapplicable to circuit courts). Given this cost and
benefit structure of judging, commentators have observed that judges
may be hesitant to expend their resources in applying standards because
"adjudicators will often determine that the marginal administrative costs
of applying a standard precisely, rather than haphazardly, based on its
underlying principles will not always exceed the marginal benefit of
doing so." 126 Thus, summarizing these clarifications, decisionmakers'
123. SCHAUER, supra note I 04, at 229 (noting the importance of "mental capacity" and opining,
in the context of standards, that "none of us, ordinary or not, have the mental capacity incessantly to
consider all of the things that an 'all things considered' decision-making model requires of us").
124. See Kaplow, supra note 104, at 571.
125. In theory, judges may balk at work that they might otherwise accept if they were paid an
annual salary of$300,000 instead of$150,000. Salary is a commonly understood drawback to a federal
judgeship.
126. Korobkin, supra note 110, at 38; Kaplow, supra note 104, at 595 (stating that "it is sensible
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resources, i.e., analytical ability, time, help from others, and money, as
well as their willingness to expend the resources, are relevant to the
choice of form.
As in many other instances, the speed limit example illustrates why
resources should be evaluated in choosing the appropriate legal form. A
strict "Drive 65" rule takes very few resources to apply; it merely
requires the decisionmaker-driver or judge-to assess the speed of a
vehicle. This assessment requires relatively little brain power, time, or
money and is not likely to exact marginal costs greater than marginal
benefits. A standard, such as "Drive Reasonably", however, demands
much more from the decisionmaker. 127 She must have knowledge of
driving and the ability to analyze the many factors that inform the
reasonableness standard. If the decisionmaker does not have such
ability, and likewise has few alternative resources, i.e., time, help,
money, the likelihood of an incorrect result is higher.
An analogy imagined by Larry Alexander perhaps illustrates the
importance of analytical ability more clearly.
A useful analogy is that of following a cookbook [i.e., following a
rule] versus acting like a master chef [i.e., following a standard].
Cookbook recipes do not capture precisely what a master chef would do.
Because most of us are not master chefs, however, we do better-come
closer to what master chefs would do-if we follow the cookbook than if
we try to emulate master chefs.
Rules are the cookbook approach to achieving the Good and the Right.
Standards are the master chef approach. Those who favor rules are
somewhat pessimistic about the abilities of those who must decide under
norms.
Those who favor standards are optimists and picture
decisionmakers as master chefs. 128

Thus, to the degree decisionmakers have the analytical expertise and
the willingness to decide multi-factorial, standard-based matters,
standards will not increase the error rate significantly. 129 However, to
to oversimplify greatly" when one is faced with applying a standard to a situation that will, in all
likelihood, never come before the decisionmaker again); SCHAUER, supra note 104, at 229 (explaining
that even if we are not "paralysed by [the] uncertainty [of standards], and stumble into numerous errors
just because we have too little time to consider too much, we often simplify our thought processes, using
a form of decision-making that limits us to the consideration of a manageable array of factors").
127. See SCHAUER, supra note 104, at 229-30 (noting that rules are easier to apply than
standards); Kaplow, supra note 104, at 570 (stating that the costs of adjudication is "greater if a standard
governs because the adjudication will also require giving content to the standard").
128. Alexander, supra note 103, at 543.
129. Regardless of the resources of a decisionmaker (or willingness to expend them) a certain
systemic error rate will always exist in standard-based cases. See Korobkin, supra note 110, at 38
("Some economic analysts recognize that adjudicators will sometimes fail to draw the legal boundary [of
a standard] optimally."). Of course, rule-based adjudication will itself involve at least some systemic
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the degree that one doubts that the analytical ability of decisionmakers is
sufficient to task at hand, a rule would be preferable to a standard.

C. The Appropriate Legal Form for Deciding
Jurisdictional Questions in Hybrid Law Cases
In Grable & Sons, the Supreme Court rejected a rule-based approach
for deciding whether federal jurisdiction should lie in suits involving
embedded federal questions. The Court explained that a "'single,
precise, all-embracing"' 130 test was inappropriate because such a test
could not account for the "'welter of issues regarding the interrelation of
federal and state authority and the proper management of the federal
judicial system. "' 131 The Court here is referring to the costs of
adjudication failure and while such costs are relevant to the decision, the
Court erred in failing to consider the many other categories of costs
attendant upon rules and standards. The Court seems oblivious to the
fact that standards will impose costs on the system as well. Only
through comparing the two sets of costs can one determine the
appropriate legal form. This section does just that. It applies the criteria
identified above to the specific jurisdictional questions faced by judges
in embedded federal question cases and concludes that a rule is
preferable to a standard in making jurisdictional decisions in these cases.
1. Frequency
As explained above, when a legal issue arises with relative frequency,
rules are preferable to standards. The example of a frequently-arising
legal question presented above was speeding. Given this example, one
might think that jurisdictional questions in hybrid law cases lie at the
opposite end of the spectrum. This, however, would be an exaggeration.
Although only 67 published circuit court opinions from 1987 through
2005 addressed federal jurisdiction in embedded federal question cases,
this number represents merely the tip of the iceberg. 132 That published
amount of error, though it is likely less than standard-based adjudication. In any event, I leave to side in
this Article the likely small percentage of errors that will result even in cases of unlimited resources.
130. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2368 (2005)
(quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 821 (1988) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
131. !d. at 2367 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal.,
463 U.S. I, 28 (1983)).
132. Moreover, there are likely more than 67 published circuit court opinions on this issue. As
explained above, see supra note 60, these cases were located by searching the Westlaw database for
published circuit cases citing Smith or Merrell Dow. It is likely that some courts-though admittedly,
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opinions constitute only a small minority of all issued opinions is well
established. Nationally, the federal publication rate sits at about only
20% 133 and seems to be decreasing every year. 134 At the district court
level, the number of embedded federal question cases increases
dramatically. While this Article does not calculate the number of
published district court opinions, the civil appeal rate-which sits at
about 9%-provides a rough estimate of the number of cases decided in
the district courts. 135 Extrapolating from the publication and appeal rate,
one can conclude that district courts handled approximately 3,700 such
cases over that past two decades. 136 Yet even the district court cases do
not account for the entire number of embedded federal questions. As
not likely very many-resolved the jurisdictional question without citing either of these cases. Some
courts may have simply cited Franchise Tax Board or no case at all.
Opinions that do not cite any precedent or only cite Franchise Tax Board, but yet deal with the
jurisdictional issues in this Article, are exceedingly difficult to track down. If a court fails to cite any
case in its analysis, one may only find the case through Boolean searches on Westlaw or Lexis, which is
often a haphazard method of finding cases. While looking for cases that cite Franchise Tax Board eases
the search somewhat, it is still onerous because Franchise Tax Board is often cited for several different
propositions, the main one of which is the well-pleaded complaint rule. Thus, a search of cases that cite
Franchise Tax Board that do not also cite Smith or Merrell Dow turns up over 800 cases within the date
range used in this Article. Most of these cases will not involve the question of federal jurisdiction over
embedded federal questions, but it is likely that at least a couple do. With sufficient resources, this
batch of cases could be read and would likely yield several additional cases. However, given the rather
modest number of cases that would be uncovered, as well as the onerous amount of work required, these
cases were not reviewed.
133. See Keith H. Beyler, Selective Publication Rules: An Empirical Study, 21 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
I, 7 (1989) (finding, inter alia, that 80.7 percent of the Sixth Circuit's decisions went unpublished in
1987); Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 189 (1999)
(finding that, nationally, 78.9 percent of appellate decisions went unpublished in 1995 and 1996 and
that, in the Fourth Circuit, that rate was as high as 90.3 percent); David Greenwald & Frederick A.O.
Schwarz, The Censorial Judiciary, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1133 (2002) ("[A]ppellate judges designate
for exclusion from the Federal Reporter approximately 80% of the opinions they write.")
134. Publication rates seem to be a factor of judicial resources and caseloads. If caseloads
increase at greater rate than judgeships, as has happened in the past decade, publication rates are like to
fall. See Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 133, at 1141-42 (2002) (noting the connection between
caseload, judgeships and publication rates); David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology,
Publication, And Asylum Law In The Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817 (2005) (noting that the
"proportion [of unpublished to published opinions] continues to rise as caseloads increase").
135. See Carol Krafka, Joe S. Cecil & Patricia Lombard, Stalking The Increase In The Rate Of
Federal Civil Appeals, 18 JUST. Svs. J. 233, 244 (1996). Although some have calculated the civil appeal
rate somewhat higher, see Michael Abramowicz, En Bane Revisited, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1609
n.38 (2000) (finding appeals rates in circuits to range between I0.3 percent and 18.6 percent), these
figures are skewed by prisoner and federal civil rights appeals. According to researchers at the Federal
Judicial Center, when one ignores these classes of high-appeal of cases, "the relationship between
appeals and district court terminations [has remained] steady through the years, with approximately 8.6
appeals filed for every 100 district court terminations." Krafka, 18 JUST. Svs. J. at 244. Because
prisoner cases rarely involve an embedded federal question and federal civil rights cases never do, the 9
percent appeal rate is a more accurate figure than the overall rate.
136. To reach this estimate, I multiplied the number of published opinions (67) by the inverse of
the publication rate ( 1/.2) by the inverse of the appeal rate ( 1/.09). This calculation yielded 3, 722 cases.
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explained above, two types of decisionmakers operate in the judicial
system; one is the judge, and the other is the primary actor. For every
jurisdictional decision made by a district court, certainly many more
such decisions are made by litigants prior to filing. Thus, the frequency
of jurisdictional questions involving an embedded federal question is
likely considerably higher than the 3,700 questions calculated above.
Admittedly, these estimates are not built on hard empirics. Possibly,
for example, the publication rate on hybrid law questions is much higher
than in other areas of law and the total number of hybrid law cases is
therefore actually much lower than this Article's rough estimate. Yet
even if the frequency of these cases is significantly lower than this
estimate, the frequency factor still suggests that a rule is preferable to a
standard. As explained above, to the extent that rules and standards
have similar promulgation costs, the frequency factor becomes less
significant in choosing between the two forms. 137 This, in fact, is likely
the case here.
The similarity of promulgation costs in this instance is mainly
attributable to the institutional nature of the Supreme Court. When the
Court chooses a rule or standard for a particular area oflaw, its members
and clerks chiefly rely on case briefs (including those submitted by the
parties as well as amici), prior case law, academic writings, and any
other literature bearing on the issue in the case. When faced with a
difficult legal question, such as one involving the Clean Air Act for
example, the Supreme Court does not commission its own study of the
issue as the EPA might do. Given the Court's method of deciding
cases-cases that, under the principle of stare decisis, amount to a legal
directive-the costs involved are chiefly the costs of labor, such as
clerks and other staff; operational costs, such as Westlaw subscriptions
and building maintenance costs; and the justices' personal opportunity
costs. Importantly, these costs (with the exception of opportunity costs)
are all "sunk"; that is, regardless of the effort expended on each case, the
costs will remain constant and cannot be recouped. Thus, regardless of
whether the Court labors intensely on a particular issue in order to
promulgate a rule, or works less hard in adopting a standard, the
promulgation costs will be essentially identical.
Moreover, even if costs were not sunk and instead varied with the
amount of effort expended on a particular case, rule-promulgation likely
does not require significantly more effort by the Court than standardpromulgation. Consider the example of Miranda v. Arizona, in which
the Court promulgated a bright-line rule on the issue of custodial

137. See supra text accompanying note 120.
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interrogations. 138 Prior to Miranda, the voluntariness of a confession
was determined using a totality of the circumstances standard. How
much "effort" the Court put into crafting its bright-line rule is
impossible to know, but a safe surmise is that the effort expended was
likely similar to the effort that would have been required by a standard.
Therefore, given that the promulgation costs of rules and standards
are likely similar in the Supreme Court and that the jurisdictional
question presented by hybrid law cases are not as rare as often thought,
the frequency factor suggests that a rule is preferable to a standard on
this issue.
2. Homogeneity
According to the legend promulgated by the Supreme Court, hybrid
law cases arise in a "kaleidoscopic [range ofJ situations." 139 At first
glance, the Supreme Court's claim of heterogeneity is understandable.
Embedded federal questions do arise in a broad variety of cases. There
are contract actions that implicate the Clean Water Act, 140 tort actions
that involve federal land grant statutes, 141 malicious prosecution claims
predicated in part on federal maritime law, 142 and state statutory claims
related to the American with Disabilities Act, 143 to name just a few. In
this sense, the cases are heterogeneous because they involve a variety of
different subject matters. Yet a different-and more appropriate-way
exists to assess the heterogeneity of these cases. Seen in this different
perspective, the cases are not heterogeneous at all but are in fact
homogeneous. This alternate perspective involves imagining how the
Supreme Court would decide each case if it considered them one at a
time. If, despite the heterogeneous facts, most jurisdictional questions
were decided the same way-i.e., cases were sent mostly to state court
or mostly to federal court-then the cases as a whole, seen through a
jurisdictional lens, are rather homogenous. As explained below, hybrid

138. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
139. Every single Supreme Court decision on this issue in the modem era has paid tribute to
Justice Cardozo's proclamation in Gully v. First Nat'/ Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1936)
that embedded federal question cases arise in "kaleidoscopic situations." See Grable & Sons Metal
Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2367 (2005); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating
Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 821 (1988); Dow Pharm. v.. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813 (1986); Franchise Tax
Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. I, 20 (1983).
140. Templeton Bd. of Sewer Comm'rs. v. Am. Tissue Mills of Mass., 352 F.3d 33 (1st Cir.
2003).
141. Nicodemus v. Union Pac. Co., 318 F.3d 1231, 1236-38 (lOth Cir. 2003).
142. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383 (3d Cir. 2002).
143. Jairath v. Dyer, 154 F.3d 1280 (lith Cir. 1998).
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law cases are in fact rather homogenous with respect to jurisdictional
considerations, making a rule preferable to a standard on this factor.
What are the components of this jurisdictional lens? They are factors
used by courts and scholars to assign cases to either state or federal
courts, or both. While these factors are familiar to most who have
studied the issue, this Article pauses here to present them. Afterwards,
the Article applies them to several hybrid law cases and concludes that
the cases, though varied in terms of the facts and law involved, are
generally homogenous in terms of the jurisdictional considerations.
a. The factors relevant to the allocation of
cases between state and federal courts

In defining the scope of federal question jurisdiction, jurists and
scholars typically consider several factors. Among these factors are the
following (1) the purposes behind federal question jurisdiction, which
include guarding against state hostility to federal law or interests, taking
advantage of federal expertise on matters of federal law, and developing
relative uniformity in the interpretation and application of federal law; 144
(2) a sovereign's interest in applying its own law; and (3) the possible
benefits of interjurisdictional dialogue. 145 These factors are each briefly
144. Though federal jurisdiction scholars are in general agreement as to why federal question
jurisdiction is needed, there is nonetheless disagreement on the number and/or organization of reasons
supporting federal question jurisdiction. See Doemberg, supra note 21, at 64 7 (finding that federal
question jurisdiction exists for two reasons: "the fear of state hostility to federal laws and the need for
uniformity in their interpretation and application"); Patti Alleva, Prerogative Lost: The Trouble with
Statutory Federal Question Doctrine, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1477, 1495-96 (1991) (listing four reasons for
federal question jurisdiction: "(I) an expertise in discerning and interpreting federal interests, (2) a
sympathetic, but respectful, national perspective, (3) the potential for uniform interpretation of federal
law, and (4) the impartiality and confidence afforded by independence"); Thomas B. Marvell, The
Rationales for Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Empirical Examination of Student Rights Litigation, 5
WIS. L. REV. 1315 (1984) (listing three rationales for federal question jurisdiction: "sympathy with
federal law," "expertise" and "uniformity").
In this Article, I rely on three factors chiefly because they are the factors most commonly cited and
also the ones the Supreme Court relied on in Grable. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2367 ("(A] federal
court ought to be able to hear claims recognized under state law that nonetheless tum on substantial
questions of federal law, and thus justify resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that
a federal forum offers on federal issues."). To be sure, I have doubts that federal question jurisdiction
does indeed serve these ends. See John F. Preis, Reassessing the Purposes of Federal Question
Jurisdiction, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. (forthcoming Mar. 2007) (arguing that neither uniformity nor
state hostility should be used to assess federal question jurisdiction issues).
145. This list of factors is by no means exhaustive. Martin Redish, for example, has developed
seven factors to consider in setting up a system of federal jurisdiction. Redish, supra note 21, at 177287. While I borrow several of his factors, I leave others out, primarily because his goal was to identify
all the factors one must consider in establishing an entire jurisdictional system from scratch. Because
the issue in this Article relates primarily to federal question jurisdiction, some of his considerations are
inapplicable. For instance, one of his factors is "institutionalism" which he describes as a concern over
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described below. 146
State Hostility. The notion that states might be hostile to federal laws
or interests pre-dates the Constitution. In Federalist No. 80, for instance,
Alexander Hamilton explained that federal law would not be
"scrupulously regarded" by the states because they would be possessed
of an intense self-interest. 147 Half a century later, state hostility played a
major-though unstated-role in Osborn v. Bank of United States, a
seminal case on federal question jurisdiction. 148 Yet the United States is
no longer the country it was in 1824. It is significantly more unified
and, although states occasionally grumble about federal intrusion into
which institution will establish the rules of jurisdiction. !d. at 1783-84. Because I assume for purposes
of this Article that the Supreme Court has the authority to define federal court jurisdiction through a
reasonable interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, I deem it unnecessary to consider this factor. Another
factor I leave to the side is litigation efficiency, which Redish connects with joinder and pendant
jurisdiction. See id. at 1778-79. These considerations likewise lie beyond the scope of this Article.
Other of Redish's factors, I consider in a different context. For instance, his concern over "fundamental
fairness" (which he describes as the concern that a litigant appear before a forum that is unbiased), I
consider in the context of federal question jurisdiction-as it is one of the purposes behind the
jurisdictional grant. !d. at I 779-82. Similarly, Redish's concern over litigant interests (which is shared
by other commentators, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal
Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 302-06 (1988)) is unnecessary to discuss because the litigant interests
mainly relate to their choice of forum, which they invoke according to their understanding of hostilities
and expertise, both of which I discuss in terms of the purposes of federal question jurisdiction. !d. at
1775-78.
146. One factor that I do not discuss, but which is sometimes discussed in case allocation, is the
caseload of the federal judiciary. According to some commentators, because overcrowded dockets
affect courts' ability to mete out justice, caseloads should be "an accepted factor in judicial decisionmaking." POSNER, supra note 92, at 314-19. Other commentators, however, insist that "[t]he federal
courts do not exist for the purpose of clearing their dockets, ... [but to] interpret and enforce federal
law ... [and if] the commitment of significant resources is required to accomplish this goal, then so be
it." See Redish, supra note 21, at 1786.
While a comprehensive analysis of the case load rationale is beyond the scope of this Article, I note
here some initial skepticism of analyzing federal caseloads to define the contours of federal question
jurisdiction. While legal pragmatism-a theory that would justify the analysis of caseloads in these
situations-has much to say about federal jurisdiction, it is not clear that the baldly pragmatic analysis
of case loads is appropriate here. Nonetheless, even if such pragmatism were justified, it is certainly a
less important factor than the others. Thus, its use or non-use is not likely to affect the analysis in this
Article.
147. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 535 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961).
148. 22 U.S. 738 (1824). The role of state hostility is revealed in Justice Johnson's dissent in
Osborn. See id. at 871-72 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (stating that the "policy of the decision is obvious,"
namely to "render[] all the protection necessary, that the general government can give to this Bank")
Years later, Justice Frankfurter made the same observation. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 481 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Marshall's holding [in Osborn] was
undoubtedly influenced by his fear that the bank might suffer hostile treatment in the state courts that
could not be remedied by an appeal on an isolated federal question."); see also James E. Pfander, Article
I Tribunals, Article III Courts, And The Judicial Power Of The United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643,
713 n.314 (2004) ("Osborn itself grew out of a perception that federal instrumentalities may need
protection from hostile state officers and state court judges who would otherwise adjudicate common
law claims.").
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state affairs, pervasive regulation by the federal government is the
widely-accepted norm. Thus, both courts and commentators have
claimed that the notion of state hostility to federal law is outdated and
unrealistic. 149 Although some still maintain that federal courts are more
solicitous of civil rights than state courts, 150 few studies have confirmed
this 151 and many seem to have disproved it. 152 Still others doubt that the

149. See also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (refusing to intervene in state proceedings in
part because states can be trusted to reach the right result); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 517 (I 976)
(refusing to recognize federal habeas claims premised on Fourth Amendment violations in part because
of an "unwilling[ness] to assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to
constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several States"); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) ("It is generally to be assumed that state courts and prosecutors will observe
constitutional limitations as expounded by this Court, and that the mere possibility of erroneous initial
application of constitutional standards will usually not amount to the irreparable injury necessary to
justifY a disruption of orderly state proceedings."); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 440
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (claiming that "no one could reasonably think that the judges of
Wisconsin have less fidelity to due process requirements of the Federal Constitution than we do");
Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richmond Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 518-19 (1955) (refusing to
allow injunction of state court proceedings) ("The assumption upon which the argument proceeds is that
federal rights will not be adequately protected in the state courts, and the 'gap' complained of is
impatience with the appellate process if state courts go wrong. But during more than half of our history
Congress, in establishing the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, in the main relied on the adequacy
of the state judicial systems to enforce federal rights, subject to review by this Court.... We cannot
assume that this confidence has been misplaced."); In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611
(1975) (refusing "to base a rule on the assumption that state judges will not be faithful to their
constitutional responsibilities"); Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act
of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 69-70 (1923) ("[T]here is now little danger that the State court will not
amply protect persons claiming Federal rights.")
150. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 110; Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 826
n.6 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Although this concern [over state hostility] may be less
compelling today than it once was, the American Law Institute reported as recently as 1969 that 'it is
difficult to avoid concluding that federal courts are more likely to apply federal law sympathetically and
understandingly than are state courts."') (citing AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF
JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (1969)). For an analysis of the ways in which
parity affects jurisdictional issues, see Chemerinsky, supra note 145, at 239-55.
151. See Paul R. Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, The Interplay of Preferences, Case Facts, Context,
and Rules in the Politics ofJudicial Choice, 59 J. POL. 1206, 1221-22 (1997); Andrew Gelman, et al., A
Broken System, The Persistent Patterns of Reversals of Death Sentences in the United States, I J.
EMPIRCAL LEGAL STUD. 209, 230-31 (2004); Thomas B. Marvell, The Rationales for Federal Court
Jurisdiction: An Empirical Examination of Student Rights Litigation, 5 WIS. L. REV. 1315 (1984)
(finding that, of 267 attorneys surveyed in student rights cases, most preferred to file in federal court);
Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum in Removal Cases under Diversity and Federal Question
Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 369,428 (1992) (finding that 50.7 percent of defense attorneys and 26.3
percent of plaintiff's attorneys cited local bias as the reason for removal to federal court).
152. MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE & JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS: THE
INEVITABILITY OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 34-62 (1999) (examining empirical evidence on parity and
arguing that it demonstrates that claims of federal rights are equally likely to be upheld in state court and
federal court); Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State
Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 232-46 (1983)
(claiming that empirical evidence supports a finding of parity between state and federal courts with
respect to enforcement of federal rights); Brett Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical
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thesis is empirically testable. 153
Expertise. Federal expertise in the field of federal law is another
reason often advanced for federal question jurisdiction. Although this
factor was not an original reason for vesting federal courts with
jurisdiction to interpret federal law (the first Article III courts, of course,
began without any experience in federal law whatsoever), it has become
a widely proffered reason for § 1331 jurisdiction. In a report titled
"Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal
Courts," the American Law Institute explained that "[t]he federal courts
have acquired a considerable expertness in the interpretation and
application of federal law which would be lost if federal question cases
were given to the state courts." 154 More recently, Judge Guido Calabresi
of the Second Circuit boldly declared that state judges "are not experts
on federal law and, with great respect to them, they are not good at
it." 155 The Supreme Court as well has endorsed this theory, most
particularly in Grable & Sons itself. 156
Uniformity. The final reason typically proffered for federal question
jurisdiction is to promote the uniform interpretation of federal law. On
this matter as well, Alexander Hamilton was the first to explain the
rationale in detail, stating that "[t]hirteen independent courts of final
Comparison of State and Lower Federal Court Interpretations of Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 233,285 (1999) (concluding that there is "strong evidence of
parity in the takings area"); William B. Rubenstein, The Myth a/Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 599
(1999) (concluding, with respect to gay rights, that state courts may be as solicitous (or more) than
federal courts); DANIEL PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW 109-16 (2003) (stating that state
courts were more hospitable to gay rights and federal courts); See Sara C. Benesh & Wendy L.
Martinek, State Court Decision Making in Confession Cases, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 109 (2002) (analyzing 661
state court confession cases and concluding that state courts generally complied with federal supreme
court precedent).
153. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF
JUDICIAL POWER 3 (1980) ("There are, to my knowledge, no statistical data to support the assertion that
federal courts are, on the whole, better equipped to guard federal interests than their state counterparts.
Indeed, it would be difficult to devise a system of measurement which could be used to answer that
question empirically."); LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 23 (1999) ("The question does not lend
itself to empirical testing."); Erwin Chemerinsky, supra note 145 at 256 ("[F]ocusing on parity is futile
because ultimately the issue of parity is an empirical question for which no empirical measure is
possible.").
154. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note !50, at 164-65 (1969).
155. Guido Calabresi, Federal And State Courts: Restoring A Workable Balance, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1293, 1304 (2003) ("'We are federal judges, we have more knowledge of federal law. You are
state judges, you have more knowledge of state law. Let each of us do our job and not be insulted."');
see also Kurland, supra note I, at 487 ("I start with the principle that the federal courts are the primary
experts on national law just as the State courts are the final expositors of the laws of their respective
jurisdictions."); Friedman, supra note 97, 1236-37.
156. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2368 (2005)
(noting that the federal government and litigants "may find it valuable to come before judges used to
federal tax matters").
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jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the same laws, is a hydra
in government from which nothing but contradiction and confusion can
proceed." 157 In the more-than-two-hundred years since Hamilton's
statement of the uniformity principle, numerous courts 158 and
commentators 159 have concurred with his view. Indeed, the Supreme
Court noted at the outset of Grable & Sons that the "hope for
uniformity" in the interpretation of federal law should partially define
the contours of§ 1331 jurisdiction. 160 Although some have questioned
the view that federal court jurisdiction will result in greater uniformity
than state court jurisdiction, 161 the principle nonetheless remains firmly
established in the law of federal jurisdiction.
Sovereignty Interests. Courts and commentators widely agree that a
sovereign, whether a state government or the federal government, should
have primary authority to decide cases involving its own laws. "The
reason for the rule is that only the courts of the sovereign (and
particularly the sovereign's highest court) can render an authoritative
interpretation of that sovereign's laws." 162 Thus, a jurisdictional rule
should ensure that, as a general matter, state courts decide questions of
state law and federal courts decide questions of federal law. Of course,
federal diversity jurisdiction belies this claim. 163 While that is true, the
jurisdictional grant is premised on the notion that state court biases
against foreigners are a greater ill than the federal interpretation of state
law. The fact of the matter remains, however, that federal interpretation
of state law has "the potential to create a variety of problems, from the

157. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 535 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961).
158. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (stating that the "rules of
international Jaw should not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations"); Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304,347-48 (1816) (federal jurisdiction is required because without it, federal
law "would be different in different states" and may "never have precisely the same construction,
obligation, or efficacy, in any two states"); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943)
(noting that concern over the uniformity of federal Jaw counsels in favor of the creation of federal
common Jaw).
159. Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 158
(1953) (noting that federal jurisdiction is key to "achieving widespread, uniform effectuation of federal
law").
160. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2368 ("[A] federal court ought to be able to hear claims
recognized under state Jaw that nonetheless turn on substantial questions of federal law, and thus justif'y
resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal
issues.").
161. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.2, 266 (4th ed. 2003) (noting that
"[ o]n a controversial issue, there are likely to be two or three different positions adopted among thirteen
federal courts of appeals" and that "[ e ]ven if all fifty state judiciaries consider the issue, there still are
likely to be just two or three different positions on a given legal question").
162. Friedman, supra note 97, at 1237.
163. 28 u.s.c. § 1332 (2006).
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minor to the chaotic" and the same can be said of state interpretation of
federallaw. 164
Interjurisdictional Dialogue. Another factor to consider in allocating
cases between state and federal courts is the extent to which either
sovereign might benefit from having the courts of another sovereign
apply its law. Commonly referred to as "cross pollination," the idea
captures the hope, and occasional reality, that a federal court may be
able to help develop state law, or that a state court may be able to help
develop federal law. The assistance stems from a sovereign's fresh view
of the law in question. There is a dialogic quality to this factor; it relies
on different sovereigns' having different perspectives on a particular
law, and on an assumption that more perspectives generally lead to a
better substantive result. 165 David Shapiro has argued, for example, that
states have benefited from federal court interpretation of their laws. 166
Other commentators have generally agreed. 167
Of course, the presumed benefits of cross pollination seem to conflict
with the sovereignty interests identified above. In permitting federal
courts to "cross pollinate" state laws, federal jurisdiction-at least to
some extent-supplants states as sovereigns. If the ability to define its
own law is part of what makes a sovereign "sovereign," then cross
pollination can only have a delegitimizing effect. The problem is
164. Friedman, supra note 97, at 1238; see also Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views
Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REv. 1671, 1677-79 (1992)
(explaining the effects of diversity jurisdiction on state law); Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the
Power of Federal Courts to CertifY Questions of State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1672, 1674 n.3 (2003)
(listing instances where federal courts have erroneously interpreted state law and noting the sometimes
long delay before such interpretations are rectified by state courts).
165. See Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts,
87 CAL. L. REV. 1409, 1465 (characterizing cross pollination as a type of"dialog").
Of course, this is not always true, as one can imagine that sometimes there are "too many cooks in
the kitchen" to accomplish a desired task. In the context of federal-state cross pollination, however,
there are only two "cooks" in the kitchen and the likelihood for conflict is significantly reduced.
166. David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV.
317,325 (1977).
167. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 16-17 (1985) (noting the
contribution of foreign jurisdictions to the development of one jurisdiction's laws); William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 367, 386 (1980) (same); Schapiro, supra note 165, at 1467 (noting that "territorial or systemic
boundaries need not disqualify a court from making a valuable contribution to the ongoing interpretive
exercise"); Redish, supra note 21, at 1773 (noting that "intersystemic cross-pollination" is one of seven
factors to consider if one were to set up a jurisdictional system from scratch); Shapiro, supra note 166, at
324-27 (noting federal court contribution to development of state law); Geri J. Yonover, A Kinder,
Gentler Erie: Reining in the Use of Certification, 47 ARK. L. REV. 305, 325-26 (1994) (discussing
notion that "federal court ascertainment of state law, even if subsequently proven wrong, has a positive,
normative effect on the development of state law"); Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere:
Federal Courts and State Power, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1505--06, n.ll6 (1987) (discussing the
usefulness of having multiple interpreters of federal law).
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particularly acute where a novel state law question is involved. In such
situations, the benefits from cross pollination by a federal court are
likely smaller than the costs of a potential misstatement of state law. 168
Moreover, with respect to a novel legal question, the federal decision
would carry no authority. 169 On the other hand, where a state law is
settled or a novel state law may implicate federal statutory or
constitutional issues, the costs of cross pollination are likely low and the
new perspective on the law may prove helpful. 170
Thus, in allocating cases between federal and state courts,
interjurisdictional dialogue is worthy of consideration inasmuch as cases
call for one sovereign to assist the other in handling cases premised on
settled law. Inasmuch as unsettled questions of law are involved,
however, interjurisdictional dialogue is an inappropriate consideration.
b. The homogeneity of hybrid law cases
from a jurisdictional perspective

Although hybrid law cases involve a variety of different facts and
federal laws, and thus might be considered heterogeneous, when one
views them according to the factors relevant to federal jurisdiction
decisions, they are in reality quite similar.
State Hostility. Among the hybrid law cases analyzed for this Article,
the amount of expected state hostility to the federal laws embedded
within state suits is roughly similar. More specifically, in the great
majority of cases, there is little reason to expect hostility. As described
above, the majority of hybrid law cases involve only insignificant

168. See Friedman, supra note 97, at 1240. This principle is recognized through state certification
statutes, which roughly mimic the principle (though not procedure) established in R.R. Comm'n of Tex.
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See 17A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 4248 (2d ed. 1988 and Supp. 1996) (explaining that most states now have
certification statutes). Using this tool, federal courts are permitted to certify novel state law questions to
state high courts. Although certification is rather commonplace today, some have called for its
increased usage. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75-76 (1997); Calabresi, supra
note 155, at 1301 (stating that, on the question of avoiding the ills of diversity jurisdiction, the "answer
is ... [to] certify, certify, certify").
169. See Ann Althouse, The Authoritative Lawsaying Power of the State Supreme Court and the
United States Supreme Court: Conflicts of Judicial Orthodoxy in the Bush-Gore Litigation, 61 Mo. L.
REv. 508, 510 (2002) (noting that, except where federal law affects the outcome, it is
"axiomatic ... [that] a state's highest court is the final, authoritative expositor of a state's statutory and
constitutional law"); Friedman, supra note 97, at 1239-40 ("No matter how clever, original, or even
persuasive a federal court's interpretation of state law is, it is not authoritative.").
170. Shapiro, supra note 166, at 325-26 (stating that federal judges serve the states by "setting
[federal] statutory or constitutional boundaries"); Friedman, supra note 97, at 1239 (citing Shapiro and
noting that "setting (federal) statutory or constitutional boundaries ... is precisely what federal judges
should do").
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interpretations of federal law. 171 It is difficult to see how a state court
can express hostility to federal law, for example, by referring to a federal
drug schedule to see if a certain drug is listed there, 172 or by determining
whether a written contract complies with a federal law requiring banking
contacts to be written. 173 Although a certain number of hybrid law cases
do involve the actual interpretation and application of federal law, little
reason exists to expect hostility in many of these cases. The fear of state
hostility to federal law has typically been linked to civil rights cases 174
and, among the hybrid law cases requiring federal law to be interpreted,
very few are civil rights cases. 175
State courts could plausibly harbor hostility for federal laws that
intrude upon the state regulatory sphere. Federal telecommunications or
environmental laws might fall into this category. 176 These cases,
however, represent a small minority of hybrid law cases. 177 Thus, when
viewed as a whole, hybrid law cases are generally quite similar with
respect the amount of expected state hostility.
Expertise. At first glance, hybrid law cases would seem to be uniform
in their need for expertise in the interpretation of federal law. After all,
each case, by definition, involves a federal law, and would therefore
profit equally from federal expertise. This uniformity, however, does
not hold true for two reasons. First, as already noted, the majority of
hybrid law cases do not call for any meaningful interpretation of federal
law. Second, the cases that do call for an interpretation of federal law
vary in the complexity of the federal law involved. While some cases
involve rather simple and straightforward federal laws, others involve
complex laws such as the Telecommunications Act, ERISA, and
environmental statutes.

I 71. See supra text accompanying notes 80-89.
172. Bailey v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 965, 968 (6th Cir. 1995) (suit under state statute prohibiting
dispensation of certain drugs without prescription required reference to federal regulations because state
statute applied to drugs listed in the federal regulation).
173. Dunlap v. G&L Holding Group, Inc., 381 FJd 1285, 1291-93 (lith Cir. 2004) (suit alleging
breach of contract related to formation of internet bank required reference to federal banking regulations
because said regulations required contract to be in writing).
174. See supra text accompanying note 110.
175. See supra text accompanying note 76 (noting that only 5 out of 67 hybrid law cases seek to
vindicate federal civil rights).
176. See, e.g., City of Rome, N.Y. v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 362 F.3d 168, 174-76 (2d Cir.
2004) (suit alleging breach of duty to re-negotiate telecommunications contract required reference to
federal Telecommunications Act because statute regulated re-negotiation duties).
The
177. Moreover, such federal laws are not always intrusive of state authority.
Telecommunications Act of 1996, for example, specifically gives states a role in controlling the
administration of the Act within their respective jurisdictions. See 4 7 U .S.C. § 252 (2006) (granting state
utility commissions authority to contracts between local carriers).
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The homogeneity of hybrid law cases with respect to the importance
of expertise in federal law is thus a difficult judgment call. While the
majority of cases considered for this Article would not likely profit from
federal expertise, a significant number of cases would benefit. The
difficulty, of course, is quantifying this number so as to determine, on
the whole, whether hybrid law cases are generally homogeneous or
heterogeneous. As it turns out, this difficult task is not necessary
because the other four factors used to assess the homogeneity of hybrid
law cases from a jurisdictional perspective cut decidedly in favor of
homogeneity.
Uniformity. Hybrid law cases all implicate the concern for uniformity
in much the same way, which is to say almost not at all. As an initial
matter, uniformity becomes an issue only when federal law is
interpreted, which, as explained above, occurs in a minority of hybrid
law cases. Among the cases that do involve interpretation of federal
law, however, the concern for uniformity is infinitesimal because state
courts rarely publish their interpretations of federal law. As explained
above, of the 67 hybrid law cases studied for this Article, 44 were
remanded to state court. Of those remanded to state court, not a single
one resulted in a published opinion interpreting federal law. Either of
two reasons might cause this result. First, the state court did not
interpret the federal law for some reason, such as because the parties
settled or because the case was resolvable without referring to federal
law. Where federal law is not interpreted, uniformity of federal law is
obviously not a concern. Second, the state court interpreted the federal
law but did not publish its opinion. An unpublished opinion certainly
cannot breed disuniformity, for it will never be used as precedent in
successive cases. 178
Thus, because many hybrid law cases do not call for the interpretation
of federal law, and the cases that do call for an interpretation rarely
result in published opinions, hybrid law cases are exceedingly
homogenous in how they implicate uniformity concerns.
Sovereignty Interests. By definition, all hybrid law cases involve
state and federal law. Thus, all hybrid law cases implicate the
sovereignty interests of states and the federal government. This is not to
say, of course, that the sovereignty interests of each sovereign are
roughly equal. As explained below, state interests are almost always
greater than the federal interests. Rather, it is to say that the conflict
between state and federal interests is roughly similar in most hybrid law

178. As noted above, I define an "unpublished" opinion as any opinion not available through
LexisNexis or Westlaw. See supra note 94.
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cases.
Most hybrid law cases implicate state sovereignty interests
significantly and federal sovereignty interests only minimally. The
famous hybrid law case of Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust-which
tested a major Congressional program and turned solely on a federal
constitutional issue-is an outlier on the spectrum of hybrid law cases.
Most hybrid cases are mainly creatures of state law and implicate federal
law only tangentially. For example, breach of contract suits typically
focus (as one might expect) on the rights and duties of the parties under
the contract as interpreted under state law and involve federal law only
inasmuch as federal law regulates the field of commerce generally, or
the specific contract in particular. 179 In very few cases is federal law the
only disputed portion of the case.
Therefore, with respect to sovereignty interests, hybrid law cases look
quite similar. They generally implicate state interests significantly and
federal interests minimally, if at all.
Interjurisdictional Dialogue. The importance of dialogue between
state and federal courts applies with similar force in most hybrid law
cases. The typical hybrid law case calls for the interpretation of a
significant amount of state law and a small amount of federal law. As
noted above, federal law occasionally appears in a case more
prominently than usual. This does not mean, however, that the value of
interjurisdictional dialogue is different in these cases; rather, it suggests
that the sovereign likely to profit from the dialogue will differ. 180 If a
federal court hears a case involving significant amounts of settled state
law, a state is likely to benefit somewhat from the federal view of its
laws. In the opposite situation, where a case involves significant
amounts of settled federal law, the federal government is likely to
benefit to some degree from a state opinion.
Notably, the hybrid law cases studied for this Article did not involve
novel questions of state or federal law. Were novel questions, whether
of state or federal law, appearing routinely, but not uniformly, in hybrid
law cases, the interjurisdictional dialogue principle might apply with
varying force. As explained above, inasmuch as interjurisdictional
179. See e.g.. AmSouth Bank v. Dale, 386 F.3d 763, 777 (6th Cir. 2004) (breach of contract suit
by banks against insurance companies required reference to the federal Bank Secrecy Act because the
federal statute regulated portions of parties obligations relevant to the Joss event); Interstate Petrol. Corp.
v. Morgan, 228 F.3d 331, 335 (4th Cir. 2000) (suit alleging breach of gas station franchise agreement
required reference to Petroleum Marketing Practices Act because certain franchising agreements are
regulated by the Act).
180. Put another way, interjurisdictional dialogue is a jurisdiction-neutral principle. It does not
prefer state jurisdiction over federal, or vice versa. Instead, it merely prefers that each jurisdiction
benefit from potential dialogue with the other.
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dialogue impinges upon principles of sovereignty, it is thought to yield
in cases where the interests of the sovereign are at their highest, such as
in cases involving novel questions of law. Because hybrid law cases
rarely involve novel questions of law, the interjurisdictional dialogue
principle generally applies with similar force along the spectrum of
hybrid law cases.

* * *

To summarize this section, hybrid law cases are generally
homogenous when viewed according the jurisdictional principles
applicable to allocating federal question cases between state and federal
court. First, state hostility to federal law applies to the great majority of
hybrid law cases in much the same way. Second, although the majority
of cases would benefit equally from federal expertise, a significant
number would benefit to a different degree. This lack of homogeneity,
however, is overcome by the other three factors discussed-namely
uniformity, sovereignty interests and interjurisdictional dialogue. Each
of these principles applies with similar force in hybrid law cases.
Therefore, hybrid law cases are, on the whole, quite homogenous. The
Article now turns to the resources of decisionmakers, another factor that
bears on the choice between rules and standards.
3. Resources of Decisionrnakers
As explained above, rules are preferable to standards where
decisionrnakers are unlikely to expend the additional resources to
resolve a standard. Decisionmakers are unlikely to expend the extra
resources for one of two reasons: they either do not have the resources,
or the marginal gains from the expenditure do not exceed the marginal
costs. Thus, in choosing between a rule and a standard for dealing with
hybrid law cases, the question is one of whether resources are so scarce
among decisionrnakers that the interpretation of a standard (as opposed
to a rule) will lie beyond their means or whether the marginal benefits of
interpreting standards are likely less than the marginal costs.
Both of these questions present almost insurmountable empirical
problems. Ascertaining the resources litigants might bring to bear on
hybrid law cases or any of the marginal benefits they would expect to
receive from such suits is nearly impossible. Though ascertaining the
same information for judges is difficult, one significant difference makes
this determination easier: Judges leave evidence of their decisions, i.e.,
their judicial opinions. Although one must be careful not to infer too
much from such opinions, some general conclusions present themselves
on the issue of the expenditure of resources.
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For judges, the most important resource is their mental ability. 181
Judges with exceptional analytical abilities-those Larry Alexander
would call "master chefs"-will likely be equipped to apply legal
standards. On the other hand, judges lacking such abilities-those
Alexander would simply call line cooks-will more likely find standards
challenging to apply, thus resulting in a higher error rate. In considering
the resources of judges then, the question becomes whether the federal
judiciary is made up of master chefs or line cooks. Given the widelyheld view that federal judges are cut from a finer judicial cloth, 182 one
might expect there to be far more chefs than cooks. Yet, on the issue of
discretion in hybrid law cases, Professor Daniel Meltzer offers notable
dissent from this view. In a recent article, he asked whether "the men
and women who comprise the federal bench have been or will be able to
craft a sufficiently determinate body of doctrine by following the
[discretionary] approach [Professor David] Shapiro proposes." 183
Speaking specifically on the issue of jurisdiction in hybrid law cases,
Meltzer opined that "Shapiro may at times be just a little too sanguine"
about the workability of a discretion-conferring standard, as opposed to
a discretion-constraining rule. 184 Thus, after having read a substantial
number of lower court opinions, he expressed "doubt[]" as to "whether
federal judges, as intelligent and dedicated as most of them are, can in
fact establish a coherent framework for the boundaries of subject matter
jurisdiction predicated ... upon a federal ingredient in a state law claim
for relief." 185 He suggested that academics, such as Shapiro, who have
analyzed the issue are "experts in a way that generalist federal judges are
not." 186 "Academics are unusually good analysts," Meltzer explained,
and often "have a taste, as a matter of professional inclination, for
complexity." 187

181. The availability of other resources-such as time and money-generally does not constrain
judges. While judges might prefer to have extra money so as to hire more clerks, judges do have the
luxury of time. In the great majority of cases, there is no deadline before which they must issue an
opinion. Opinions that are not finished today can generally be finished tomorrow, or the next day, or the
next month. In this sense, the truism that "time is money" applies with force to judging. That is, time is
a abundant resource that compensates for any monetary constraints.
182. See Neuborne, supra note 110, at 1121 (claiming that a "competence gap exists between the
state and federal courts").
183. See Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1911.
184. /d. at 1912.
185. /d. at 1913.
186. /d. at 1911 (citing Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101
MICH. L. REV. 885, 888 (2003) as support for this proposition).
187. !d. (citing Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences and Cures, 42
DUKE L.J. I, 34--38 (1992) as support for this proposition). Professor Meltzer was quick to add that
"[m)any academics ... are entirely lacking in other qualities necessary to be a good judge." /d.
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Thus, judicial opinions in hybrid law cases suggest, to some extent at
least, that federal judges may not be sufficiently competent to apply a
standard. A more empirical method exists for assessing this contention,
however. The reversal rate in hybrid law cases is roughly four times the
rate of reversal for all civil cases. 188 While one must be careful not to
infer too much from this fact, 189 this high reversal rate suggests that, for
one reason or another, federal judges may not be investing the analytical
effort necessary to resolve hybrid law jurisdiction questions that they
invest on many other legal questions. 190

*

*

*

Using guidelines developed in Part III.C for choosing between a rule
and standard, this section sought to determine whether a rule or standard
is preferable in resolving jurisdiction questions in hybrid law cases. As
established above, such questions arise with significant frequency, are
generally homogenous with respect to jurisdictional principles, and, for
whatever reason, do not seem to elicit adequate analyses from the
district courts. Accordingly, a rule is preferable to a standard on this
issue. Having established the preferability of a rule over a standard for
hybrid law cases, the Article now turns to the appropriate jurisdictional
rule in hybrid law cases.
IV. THE PROPER RULE IN HYBRID LAW CASES
Unlike the choice between a rule and standard-which was based on
an analysis of the costs of promulgation and application of each legal

188. See supra text accompanying notes 90-93.
189. For a variety of reasons, the reversal rate in hybrid law cases may be artificially high
compared to similar cases. Nonetheless, the rate is still likely higher than the average reversal rate. See
supra text accompanying notes 90-93.
190. One might argue that the reversal rate is high not because judges fail to put in enough effort,
but because the Merrell Dow doctrine was confusing and therefore more difficult to apply than other
doctrines. It follows, the argument goes, that now that the confusion created by Merrell Dow has been
cleared by Grable & Sons, the reversal rate should decrease. This argument, while plausible to a certain
degree, is nonetheless belied by the fact that many courts read Merrell Dow to create a bright-line rule.
See, e.g., Seinfeld v. Austen, 39 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing numerous cases holding that
"[u]nder Merrell Dow ... 'if federal law does not provide a private right of action, then a state law
action based on its violation perforce does not raise a substantial federal question"') (quoting Utley v.
Varian Assoc., Inc. 811 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir.I987). Moreover, even if Merrell Dow did not create a
strict rule, its standard was nowhere near as broad as that adopted in Grable & Sons. See Grable & Sons
Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2368 (2005) (instructing courts to determine
federal question jurisdiction over hybrid law cases by considering the "welter of issues regarding the
interrelation of federal and state authority and the proper management of the federal judicial system").
Thus, while Grable & Sons clarified some of the confusion surrounding Merrell Dow, it did not replace
it with a clearly defined standard. It is not at all clear, therefore, that the reversal rate in these cases will
decrease.
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form-the choice between alternative rules turns on substantive
considerations about the allocation of power between the states and the
This enterprise necessarily admits of the
federal judiciary. 191
congressional purposes behind federal question jurisdiction, but also
accounts for other factors that courts and scholars have traditionally
found compelling in drawing jurisdictional lines.
In fact, the
considerations employed in this section are those that the Court endorsed
in Grable & Sons, albeit somewhat indirectly. 192
This Part identifies the appropriate rule in hybrid law jurisdictional

191. One might think that, because federal question jurisdiction is controlled by statute, the proper
analysis in this circumstance should be one solely of statutory interpretation. Yet, the Supreme Court's
decisions on federal question jurisdiction under § 1331 have never been efforts at statutory
interpretation. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 24 ("Congress's intent [in enacting § 1331] has had little
or nothing to do with the Court's decisions concerning what constitutes a federal question."). For
example, in Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 ( 1908), the Court adopted the wellpleaded complaint rule-a rule effectively excluding large numbers of cases presenting a federal
question. Other cases-most notably Grable & Sons-exemplifY the same point. See, e.g., Merrell
Dow Pharm. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986), Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. 2363; Moore v. Chesapeake
& Ohio Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205, 214-215 (1934); Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 508
(1900). Of course, an established pattern of ignoring the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 does not give one
license to ignore it in the future. Yet, because the phrase "arising under" does not admit of an obvious
meaning, courts must resort to underlying principles when seeking to give content to the statute.
Therefore, in keeping with this observation as well as Supreme Court precedent on the matter, the
contours of jurisdiction in this instance will be determined with reference to the principles underlying
federal jurisdiction.
Moreover, numerous scholars in this field have taken the same approach-focusing on principles,
purposes and logic instead of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 97, at 1216 ("A
central task of the law of federal jurisdiction is allocating cases between state and federal courts."); Paul
M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 622
( 1981) ("[State and federal courts] will continue to be partners in the task of defining and enforcing
federal constitutional principles. The question remains as to where to draw the lines; but line-drawing is
the correct enterprise."); Redish, supra note 21, at 1772-87 (discussing seven factors relevant to
determining the proper allocation of judicial power between the states and the federal government);
Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of
Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609, 625 (1991) (stating that "the challenge [of allocating cases
between state and federal court]lies in finding a principled means of identifying those cases that belong
in federal court"); Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 506 (1928) ("[T]he proper allocation of authority between United States
and state courts is but part of the perennial concern over the wise distribution of power between the
states and the nation.").
192. In its opinion, the Court first noted that the purposes of federal question jurisdiction were
relevant to its decision. See Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2367 ("[A] federal court ought to be able to
hear claims recognized under state law that nonetheless turn on substantial questions of federal law, and
thus justify resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on
federal issues."). The Court later noted that the "welter of issues regarding the interrelation of federal
and state authority" should be considered as well. While the Court did not specifically enumerate these
"issues," it later took into account factors such as respect for state sovereignty and litigant choice. !d. at
2368-69 (stating that federal interests in federal tax law will be promoted, state interests in applying
their own law would not be greatly diminished, and that litigants may prefer to have access to the
expertise of a federal judge).
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cases. It does this by first determining the courts in which hybrid law
cases are best adjudicated. A comparison of the characteristics of hybrid
law cases to the purposes underlying federal question jurisdiction
reveals that hybrid law cases, in general, do not implicate the purposes
behind federal question jurisdiction and thus belong in state courts.
Having established that hybrid law cases generally belong in state
courts, this Part then crafts a rule that, when applied, will allocate the
majority of hybrid law cases to the state courts. The appropriate rule for
accomplishing this allocation is the "cause-of-action test." That is,
federal question jurisdiction should obtain only in cases where a federal
cause of action supports the federal law implicated by the plaintiffs
complaint.

A. The Proper Courts to Adjudicate Hybrid Law Cases
To determine where hybrid law cases are best adjudicated, one must
compare their characteristics with the purposes underlying federal
question jurisdiction. If hybrid law cases implicate the purposes of
federal question jurisdiction, then the cases should be adjudicated in
federal court. If the cases do not implicate those interests, however, the
state courts should adjudicate the cases.
As explained above, the reasons for asserting federal jurisdiction are
(1) the need to protect federal law from state hostility, 193 (2) the
importance of federal expertise in resolving federal questions, 194 (3) the
need for uniformity in the interpretation of federal law, 195 ( 4) the
sovereignty interests of the states and federal governmene 96 and (5) the
benefits of interjurisdictional dialogue. 197 This section now views
hybrid law cases in light of these principles.
State Hostility. The prospect that states might be inhospitable to
federal laws or interests is insignificant in hybrid law cases for several
reasons. First, as described above, the majority of hybrid law cases
involve only a ministerial application of federal law or no application of
federal law at all. 198 As noted above, state courts will have difficulty
expressing hostility to federal law, for example, by referring to a federal
drug schedule, 199 or by determining whether a contract is in writing as

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

See supra text accompanying notes 147-153.
See supra text accompanying notes 154-156.
See supra text accompanying notes 157-161.
See supra text accompanying notes 162-164.
See supra text accompanying notes 165-167.
See supra text accompanying notes 80-89.
Bailey v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 965, 968 (6th Cir. 1995) (suit under state statute prohibiting

2006]

HYBRID LAW CASES

195

required by federal law.Z00 Moreover, the cases that do involve
interpretation of federal law are generally not cases where hostility is
thought to be most likely-that is, civil rights cases. 201
State hostility, however, is not always confined to civil rights and
states might foreseeably resent federal intrusion into state regulatory
domains through telecommunications or environmental laws, for
example. This potential for hostility presents only a small risk to federal
interests for three reasons. First, no evidence of state hostility exists in
any hybrid law cases remanded to state court. Out of the 44 cases
remanded to state court, not a single one was resolved with a published
opinion addressing the federal question. While state courts may
possibly vent their hostility to federal law in unpublished opinions, the
absence of even a single published opinion suggests that risk of hostility
in this area is more imagined than real. 202
The second reason why hostility in this category of cases presents
little concern is that, should a state assume a contrarian position, the
United States Supreme Court can always take jurisdiction and reverse
the state court's holding. 203 Although the Court's ability to superintend
the state courts is highly limited, 204 the potential for such review serves
as at least some disincentive for state courts to flout federal law.
Moreover, should a state court decision violate federal law on an
important national policy matter, such as telecommunications or
environmental law, studies have shown the Supreme Court is much
more likely to grant certiorari, especially where the state decision
conflicts with other lower court decisions or Supreme Court

dispensation of certain drugs without prescription required reference to federal regulations because state
statute applied to drugs listed in the federal regulation).
200. Dunlap v. G&L Holding Group, Inc., 381 F.3d 1285, 1291-93 (lith Cir. 2004) (suit alleging
breach of contract related to formation of internet bank required reference to federal banking regulations
because said regulations required contract to be in writing).
20 I. See supra text accompanying note 76 (identifYing the 5 of 67 hybrid law cases seeking to
vindicate civil rights).
202. One might even hypothesize that a state court having hostility for federal law might prefer to
publish its opinion. Published opinions, because of their precedential force, would be more likely to
advance the hostile objectives than an unpublished opinion.
203. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2006) (granting the Supreme Court the authority, but not the
obligation, to review state high court decisions involving federal questions).
204. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court's Plenary Docket,
58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 737,739,743 (2001) (noting the Court's decrease in docket size from an about
150 cases prior to the 1980s to between 70-80 currently); Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari:
Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges' Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1704-13 (2000)
(noting the plenary discretion afforded to the Supreme Court to decline appellate jurisdiction); Michael
E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 35 IND. L. REV.
335, 336, 350 (2002) (noting the shrinking case load of the Supreme Court and its effect on state court
decisions, especially at a time when lower federal dockets are expanding).
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precedent. 205
Third, while one must be careful not to overstate the Supreme Court's
ability to mollify state hostility, one must also be careful not to overstate
the concept of state hostility itself. As noted above, the fear of state
disobedience that made federal question jurisdiction appropriate in 1787
is much less compelling in today's era, where pervasive federal
regulation is an accepted norm. 206
Thus, although the potential for state hostility exists if state courts are
to decide the federal questions in hybrid law cases, this hostility is likely
to be quite limited, if existent at all.
Expertise. Hybrid law cases do not typically demand expertise in
federal law. As discussed in Part II.B above, the majority of hybrid law
cases involve little or no interpretation of federal law. Little expertise is
needed, for example, to determine if a party to a contract has fulfilled his
contractual duty to obtain federal regulatory approval for a rate
increase. 207 In other cases, such as a suit over a contract to build a
public housing facility that was generally regulated by the Department
of Housing and Urban Development, no interpretation of federal law is
required. 208 Even cases that require actual interpretation and application
of federal law rarely involve significant analytical challenges. For
example, in malicious prosecution or professional malpractice caseswhich comprise 16% of cases requiring the interpretation of federal
law-the reviewing court need not determine the precise contours of
federal law, but need only determine whether the defendant's
interpretation oflaw was grossly incorrect. 209
205. See Solimine, supra note 204, at 359 (noting "available evidence seems to indicate that the
Supreme Court has been able, to a tolerable degree, to cany out the monitoring function [of state
courts]" and that "compelling evidence" indicates that the Court usually reviews cases of significant
political or social importance). For studies indicating that the Court is likely to review a case where
conflict among courts exists, see Gregory A. Caldiera & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and
Agenda Setting in the U.S Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 1109, 1120 (1988), S. Sidney Ulmer,
Conflict with Supreme Court Precedents and the Granting of Plenary Review, 45 J. POL. 474, 474-77
(1983) (concluding that that the Court is more likely to grant certiorari in cases where the holding
conflicts with Supreme Court precedent); S. Sidney Ulmer, The Supreme Court's Certiorari Decisions:
Conflict as a Predictive Variable, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 901,906-11 (1984) (finding a relationship
between the grant of certiorari and the existence of intercircuit conflict or conflict with Supreme Court
precedent).
206. See supra text accompanying notes 171-177.
207. Mich. S. R.R. Co. v. Branch & St. Joseph Counties Rail Users Assoc., Inc., 287 F.3d 568,
573-74 (6th Cir. 2002) (suit alleging breach of railroad contract required reference to federal railroad
laws because contract required party to obtain certificates of operation issued pursuant to federal
statute).
208. Virgin Is. Hous. Auth. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 27 F.3d 911, 916 (3rd Cir. 1994) (suit
alleging breach of contract to build public housing required reference to HUD regulations because
contracts were covered under such regulations).
209. See supra cases cited in note 89.
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Of course, certain cases will benefit from federal expertise. Examples
include suits involving major federal regulatory regimes, such as the
Telecommunications Act210 or the Clean Air Act. 211 State judges will
likely be less familiar with these and other similar statutes than federal
judges. This weakness, however, is not compelling for four reasons.
First, these cases represent a small minority of the whole. Thus, the loss
of expertise will occur only in isolated cases. Second, the lack of
expertise is likely to have deleterious impacts only on issues of first
impression. Where federal precedent exists in either the U.S. Supreme
Court or lower federal courts, state courts often follow federal
precedent. 212 Third, even if a state court were faced with an issue of first
impression or departed from federal precedent, having the state court
decide the issue still has value. Numerous commentators have observed
that state courts can contribute effectively to the development of federal
law. 213 Fourth, because these types of cases, i.e., cases involving large
federal regulatory regimes, are typically imbued with important public
interests, the Supreme Court is more likely to review them. 214
Thus, although state review of embedded federal questions will
sacrifice some federal expertise, this sacrifice, on the whole, will be
quite small. Therefore, state court jurisdiction over hybrid cases is
preferable on the issue of expertise. 215
210. See, e.g., Metheny v. Becker, 352 F.3d 458,460--61 (1st Cir. 2003) (suit against local zoning
board alleging erroneous decision by board required reference to the federal Telecommunications Act
because Act allegedly dictated board's decision).
211. See, e.g., Orrnet Corp. v. Ohio Power Co., 98 F.3d 799, 806-07 (4th Cir. 1996) (breach of
contract suit by power plant licensee alleging right to federal pollution credits required reference to EPA
regulations because regulations defined who an "owner" was for purposes of pollution credits).
212. See Preis, supra note 144, at Part JJI.A.2 (presenting empirical evidence suggesting state
courts rely on federal precedent in 58% of the cases involving federal questions).
213. See Martin H. Redish, Supreme Court Review Of State Court "Federal" Decisions: A Study
In Interactive Federalism, 19 GA. L. REV. 861, 897 (1985) (stating that state courts often can "make
contributions to the development of federal law when given the opportunity"); Robert F. Utter,
Swimming In The Jaws Of The Crocodile: State Court Comment On Federal Constitutional Issues When
Disposing Of Cases On State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1025, 1030-41 (noting a variety
of ways in which "[s]tate courts have made a valuable contribution to the analysis and development of
federal constitutional law.").
214. See Caldiera & Wright, supra note 205, at 1119, 1122 (demonstrating with statistical analysis
that the number of amicus briefs filed in favor of certiorari-a presumed indicator of the public interest
in the legal issue-is positively correlated with the likelihood of Supreme Court review).
215. One might query why state expertise in state law is not equally important as federal expertise
in federal law. Because hybrid law cases implicitly involve both state and federal law, one might think
that state expertise would be relevant as well. This, however, ignores the Supremacy Clause and its
import in the constitutional system. Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law is superior to state law.
And by extension, the correct interpretation of federal law has greater importance than the correct
interpretation of state law. Thus, when setting the boundaries of federal jurisdiction, federal expertise
overrides state expertise.
This is not to say, however, that all state interests must bow to federal needs. To the contrary, there
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Uniformity. Relegating hybrid law cases to the state courts will not
result in significant or persistent disuniformity of federal law for five
reasons. First, as explained above, the majority of hybrid law cases do
not call for any meaningful interpretation of federal law. Where little or
no interpretation is necessary, little or no disuniformity will result.
Second, even if concern exists over the minority of cases requiring
interpretation of federal law, state courts are likely to apply settled
federal law where it is extant. 216 Third, out of the 44 hybrid cases
remanded to state courts, not a single one resulted in a published
decision reaching the merits of the federal question. Thus, even if state
courts were to erroneously decide federal questions after remand, the
failure to publish them will eliminate any threatened disuniformity.
Fourth, inasmuch as some disuniformity is created, the likelihood of
review by the U.S. Supreme Court increases, thereby reducing the
likelihood that the disuniformity will persist. 217 Fifth and finally,
because hybrid law disputes can arise between diverse parties as well as
non-diverse parties, federal jurisdiction may still be asserted over the
federal question at some future time. Thus, while state jurisdiction over
hybrid law cases may result in a temporary disuniformity, as the federal
issue continues to arise between diverse parties, federal courts will have
the opportunity to clarify and unify the federal law. In this way,
disuniformity is not a permanent defect, but a temporary disequilibrium.
Sovereignty Interests. In hybrid law cases, state interests figure more
prominently than federal interests because the federal question is usually
a single, non-dispositive issue embedded within a multitude of state law
issues. For example, many cases are similar to Dunlap v. G&L Holding
Group, Inc., which involved a host of complicated state law contractual
issues. 218 Federal jurisdiction was alleged on the ground that federal law
required one of the contracts to be in writing, which it clearly was, and
that the court would therefore have to apply federal law to determine the
validity of the contract. While technically true, the magnitude of the
federal issue-both in terms of complexity and importance to the casepaled in comparison to the state law issues. Notably rare in hybrid law
cases is the situation presented in Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust,
where the federal issue was of great magnitude and constituted the only
issue disputed in the case.
is near universal agreement among scholars that states are entitled to the rights of any sovereign, namely
the presumptive right to apply their own laws in their own courts. See supra text accompanying notes
162-164.
216. See, e.g., Preis, supra note 144, at Part JII.A.2.
217. See supra sources cited in note 205.
218. 381 F.3d 1285, 1291-93 (I lth Cir. 2004).
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Put simply, hybrid law cases almost always involve more state law
than federal law. Thus, the sovereignty interests of the states are, on the
whole, greater.
Interjurisdictional Dialogue. As previously noted, the notion that a
sovereign might profit from another sovereign's interpretation of its
laws is in some conflict with the principle that a sovereign should have
primary authority to interpret its own laws. 219 Thus emerges the general
rule that interjurisdictional dialogue is wise where settled law is
concerned, but unwise where issues of first impression are concerned.
As already noted, hybrid law cases are made up mostly of state law
issues and a small amount of federal law. Given this composition, one
might think that states therefore have the most to gain from federal input
on state laws. In this same respect, however, state courts may also have
the most to lose. Because issues of first impression are more likely to
appear among the copious state issues in hybrid law cases and less likely
to appear in the comparatively few federal issues, many of which are
essentially non-issues anyway, states may suffer a higher rate of
intrusion into their sovereignty.
In the end, the importance of dialogue in the allocation of hybrid law
cases depends on the relative values of dialogue and sovereignty. If
sovereignty is highly valued, interjurisdictional dialogue is unlikely to
compel federal jurisdiction over hybrid law cases. If, on the other hand,
dialogue is considered paramount, the occasional federal interpretation
of novel state law issues will not greatly offend sovereignty interests.
Although pinpointing the relative values of these two interests is
impossible, the sovereignty interests likely surpass dialogue interests.
Sovereignty interests occupy the heartland of case allocation decisions
while dialogue interests, although valuable to some extent, lie to the
edge. Where the two conflict, therefore, sovereignty interests should
prevail. Accordingly, the principle of interjurisdictional dialogue likely
falls in favor of state court jurisdiction in hybrid law cases.

* * *

Thus, viewing hybrid law cases against the five factors mentmg
federal jurisdiction, one sees that these cases are properly heard in the
state courts. The cases (1) raise little concern of state hostility,
(2) require only a small need for federal expertise, (3) present little risk
of disuniformity, (4) implicate stronger state sovereignty interests than
federal sovereignty interests, and (5) would not benefit from dialogue to
a degree that would outweigh costs to sovereignty interests.

219. See supra text accompanying notes 162-164.
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B. The Rule for Allocating Hybrid Law Cases to State Courts
Given that hybrid law cases are best adjudicated in state courts, the
question becomes: What rule will allocate the cases to these courts?
Two rules-and only two rules-are possible. 220
First, federal courts might hold that a case presents a federal question
only when the case is predicated entirely on federal law. That is, cases
that involve both federal and state law are not cases that "arise under"
federal law. While such a rule would accomplish the allocation goal, it
would undoubtedly run afoul of the federal question statute. A case
does not cease to arise under a federal law simply because a state law
question is also involved. One might argue in response that the wellpleaded complaint rule operates with similar arbitrariness and is an
accepted jurisdictional rule (notwithstanding its criticisms). 221 Yet the
well-pleaded complaint rule is based on at least a somewhat plausible
interpretation of § 1331; that is, a case arises under federal law when
federal law gives rise to the plaintiffs claim. 222 A rule precluding
jurisdiction over a federal question simply because a state law question
is also present in the complaint cannot be justified in any similar way.
Thus, a rule requiring that federal question cases be devoid of state law
issues would not be a proper rule. 223
A second alternative would be to allow federal courts to assert
jurisdiction over hybrid law cases where the federal law implicated in
the suit was supported by a federal cause of action. The great majority
of hybrid law cases studied in this Article did not involve a federal cause
of action; thus, this rule would properly allocate the cases to state court
most of the time. 224 Moreover, the cause of action test also clears the
220. Perhaps I lack imagination on this point, but task of allocating hybrid law cases mostly to
state courts with a rule seems to admit of only two possible rules. As explained in greater detail in the
following paragraphs, the cases must either all be relegated to state courts or be allowed in federal courts
only.
221. See supra note 21.
222. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
223. Moreover, such a rule would be in considerable tension with the holding of Osborn v. Bank
of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822 (1824). There, the Court held that a state law replevin
action nonetheless arose under federal law because federal law formed an "ingredient" in the state law
claim. !d. While Osborn involved an interpretation of Article III, and not § 1331, of course, the case
nonetheless speaks to the fundamental division of labor between the federal and state judicial systems.
That division of labor is still extant today and a rule that facially contradicted it would compromise the
integrity of the principle.
224. Of course, for the cases that did involve a federal cause of action but did not implicate the
purposes underlying federal question jurisdiction, this rule might create undesirable results. Yet that
does not render the rule inappropriate; it simply makes the rule less preferable on that ground. And
because there is no other rule that is superior to this rule on the whole, it is improper to disqualify the
cause of action rule on this ground alone.
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§ 1331 hurdle in that it is a plausible interpretation of the statute. While
one cannot say that § 1331 compels a cause of action test, the
expansive-and even ambiguous-"arising under" language certainly
does notforeclose such an interpretation. 225
The cause of action test, however, has at least one shortcoming: The
determination of the existence of a cause of action is not strictly a rulebased analysis. Rather, the determination depends chiefly on a court's
analysis of congressional intent. 226 Therefore, even though the cause of
action test proposed herein seems to amount to a rule, it may, in its
operation work somewhat like a standard. Although the cause of action
test deprives judges of discretion to assert jurisdiction over claims
without federal causes of action, it does not deprive them of discretion to
determine whether such a cause of action exists.
While this concern does have some merit, it 1s ultimately
unpersuasive because the cause of action inquiry is not nearly as
discretionary as is sometimes thought. While courts at one time felt free
to create rights of action to "effect[uate] the congressional purpose"
behind a statute, 227 courts today focus more narrowly on whether the
"text and structure" of the federal statute evince a congressional intent to
create a right of action. 228 Under this stricter inquiry, courts presume
that if Congress did not explicitly create a right of action, it did not
intend that the statute be enforced by one. 229 While this presumption

225. While one would expect those who defend judicial discretion to read § 1331 broadly, see
supra sources cited in note 2, even commentators who define the courts' role narrowly find § 1331 to
admit of many interpretations. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 21, at 1794 (stating that the "broadly
phrased 'arising under' statutory language already in existence easily lends itself, both linguistically and
conceptually," to differing jurisdictional rules).
226. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
227. J.l. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,433 (1964).
228. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 275; see also Karahalios v. Nat' I Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S.
527, 532 (1989) ("The 'ultimate issue' is whether Congress intended to create a private cause of
action.") (internal quotation marks omitted). While one might posit that discerning congressional intent
is often a wide-ranging inquiry, the Supreme Court has, in the implied right of action context,
disapproved of "broad-based notion[s] of congressional intent," such as those based on committee
reports, congressional acquiescence, and failed legislative proposals. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 180 (1994). Circuit courts have generally followed this lead.
See, e.g., Mallett v. Wis. Div. of Vocational Rehab., 130 F.3d 1245, I249 (7th Cir. I997) (recognizing
the Supreme Court's "evolution in thinking about implied rights of action" and refusing to imply an
action where there was no evidence of congressional intent overcoming the presumption against an
implying a right of action); Olmsted v. Pruco Life Ins. Co., 283 F.3d 429,434 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining
that pre-Sandoval cases "belong to an 'ancien regime"' where courts were free to '"make effective
[Congress'] [statutory] purpose'" in enacting a statute) (second alteration in original).
229. W. Allis Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Bowen, 852 F.2d 251, 254 (7th Cir. 1988) ("A strong
presumption exists against the creation of ... implied rights of action."); La. Landmarks Soc'y, Inc. v.
City of New Orleans, 85 F.3d 1119, 1123 (5th Cir. 1996) (recognizing this presumption); Stowell v.
lves, 976 F.2d 65,70 n. 5 (1st Cir. 1992) (same).

202

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

can be overcome, courts only rarely do so. 230 Therefore, under the
modem cause of action inquiry, judges do not wield discretion freely.
Moreover, even if some discretion is unavoidable under the cause of
action test, the discretion is much narrower than that accorded courts
under the wandering standard promulgated by the Court in Grable &
Sons. 231 Thus, even if the cause of action test is not perfect, it is
certainly preferable.
In conclusion, the proper rule for resolving hybrid law jurisdictional
questions is whether the federal law implicated in the plaintiffs
complaint is supported by a federal right of action. This rule properly
allocates the majority of cases to state courts, is consonant with § 1331,
and will not likely increase judicial discretion or confusion in the right
of action doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION

As this Article has shown, the role of discretion in jurisdictional
determinations by the judiciary involves much more than the legitimacy
question. Even if the judiciary could legitimately claim discretion to
modify its jurisdiction, it is not at all clear that such discretion is
functionally advisable. A detailed study of hybrid law cases reveals that
the cases are best handled in the lower courts by a bright-line rule and
not a discretionary approach. Although this Article focused on only a
small area of federal jurisdiction, its conclusions suggest that the debate
over discretion must take place not only in the legitimacy sphere but
also in the functional sphere. Only then will the proper jurisdictional
rules be formulated.

230. See Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Approach, supra note 18,
at 91 (noting that, under the Court's current test, judicial creation of implied rights of action are quite
rare); Hamilton v. Allen, 396 F.Supp. 2d 545, 555 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (noting that Alexander v. Sandoval
(which instructed courts to focus only on Congressional intent) and subsequent cases, "suggest a distinct
narrowing of the implied right of action").
231. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2367-68 (2005)
(instructing courts to consider the "welter of issues regarding the interrelation of federal and state
authority and the proper management of the federal judicial system" to determine whether or not to
assert federal jurisdiction).
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APPENDIX

This chart lists 67 published opinions in which federal circuit courts
considered whether federal questions embedded within state law actions
were "substantial" enough to merit federal jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331. The cases represent almost every opinion published by a
circuit court on this issue between July 8, 1986 and June 13, 2005-the
span of time between the Merrell Dow and Grable & Sons decisions. 232
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232. Because the search for these cases was done by shepardizing Merrell Dow and Smith v.
Kansas City Title & Trust Co., it is impossible to say that every case on this issue has been found.
Conceivably, some courts could have addressed the issue without citing either case, although that would
be unlikely. See supra note 132
233. With regard to the context in which the federal question arises, the cases are coded in one of
three ways. "SIA," which stands for "statutory incorporation action," represents cases where the state
statute relied upon by the plaintiff incorporates federal law. "CIA," which stands for "contract
incorporation action," represents cases where the contract forming the basis of the suit incorporated
federal law. "FLE," which stands for "federal law-as-element," represents cases which federal law
serves as an element to a state tort or tort-like cause of action. For a detailed description of these
contexts, see supra text accompanying notes 62-75.
234. With regard to the degree of interpretation of federal law required of the court, cases are
coded as either "S" (for "significant") or "I" (for "insignificant"). While I recognize that all cases do not
fall neatly into one category or the other, it is nonetheless worthwhile to generally classif'y the cases
because there are significant differences in the amount of interpretation required. For an illustration of
these differences, see supra text accompanying notes 80-89.
235. A reversal is defined as any circuit court conclusion that the district court failed to exercise
its jurisdiction properly. Thus, even if a district made no finding as to its jurisdiction (and simply
assumed it to exist), a circuit court holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction amounts to a
reversal.
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Facts implicating federal law
was asserting ownership of a
copyright
Suit for breach of flood insurance
contract required reference to
federal law because insurance
contract was underwritten by the
National Flood Insurance
Program
Suit against state regulatory
commission required reference to
FCC ruling because plaintiffs
alleged state commission erred in
its interpretation of ruling
Malicious prosecution action
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RICO statute in order to
determine if prosecutor had
legally tenable ground for
prosecution under the law
Suit under state retaliatory
discharge statute required
reference to First Amendment of
U.S. Constitution to determine
employee's free speech rights
Suit by Native American tribes
alleging breach of licensing
agreement by state government
required reference to federal
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
because contracts were entered
into pursuant to the federal act
Former employee's wrongful
discharge claim required
reference to federal False Claims
Act because plaintiff relied on the
federal law to establish public
policy, which was relevant to
wrongful discharge claim
Free speech claim predicated on
state constitution required
reference to federal precedent on
First Amendment because state
courts sometimes rely on such
precedent in construing state free
speech rights
Suit seeking declaration of rights
under contract for sale of excess
electricity required reference to
federal TV A Act because parties
agreed in the contract to follow
provisions of the Act
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Case Name
City of Rome,
N.Y. v. Verizon
Communications
, Inc., 362 F.3d
168, 174-76 (2d
Cir. 2004).
Clark v. Velsicol
Chern. Corp.,
944 F .2d 196,
197-99 (4th Cir.
1991).

Custer v.
Sweeney, 89
F.3d 1156,
1168-69 (4th
Cir. 1996).
D'Alessio v.
N.Y. Stock
Exch., Inc., 258
F.3d 93, 99-104
(2d Cir. 200 I).

Diazv.
Sheppard, 85
F.3d 1502,
1505--06 (lith
Cir. 1996).

Dixon v. Coburg
Dairy, Inc., 369
F.3d 811, 816-19 (4th Cir.
2004).
Dunlap v. G&L
Holding Group,
Inc., 381 F.3d
1285, 1291-93
(lith Cir. 2004 ).

Gaming Corp. of
Am. v. Dorsey
& Whitney, 88
F.3d 536, 55051 (8th Cir.
1996).

Facts implicating federal law
Suit alleging breach of duty to renegotiate telecommunications
contract required reference to
federal Telecommunications Act
because statute regulated renegotiation duties
Personal injury suit required
reference to federal
environmental regulations
because plaintiff sought to rely on
defendant's violation of
regulation as per se evidence of
negligence
Legal malpractice claim against
pension fund manager required
reference to federal ERISA
because ERISA provisions
regulated certain aspects of
pension fund management
Injurious falsehood claims against
New York Stock Exchange for
banning plaintiff from trading on
exchange required reference to
federal securities laws because
laws controlled Exchange's
obligations to it members
Legal malpractice claim against
criminal defense attorney
required reference to U.S.
Supreme Court opinion on Eighth
Amendment to determine if
attorney's interpretation of case
was grossly negligent
Suit under state unlawful
termination statute required
reference to First Amendment of
U.S. Constitution to determine
employee's free speech rights
Suit alleging breach of contract
related to formation of bank
required reference to (I) federal
banking regulations because said
regulations required contract to be
in writing and (2) federal
trademark law because plaintiff
would have to prove ownership of
trademark to prevail in suit
Common law conspiracy claim
by Native American tribe
required reference to federal
Indian Civil Rights Act because
tribe alleged defendant had
conspired to violate the Act
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2006]

Case Name
Greenberg v.
Bear, Steams &
Co., 220 F.3d
22, 25-27 (2d
Cir. 2000).
Greenblatt v.
Delta Plumbing
& Heating
Corp., 68 F.3d
561, 570-71 (2d
Cir. 1995).
Griffis v. Gulf
Coast Pre-Stress
Co., Inc., 850
F.2d 1090,
1091-92 (5th
Cir. 1988).

Her Majesty The
Queen In Right
of the Province
of Ontario v.
City of Detroit,
874 F.2d 332,
341 (6th Cir.
1989).
Heydon v.
MediaOne of
S.E. Mich., Inc.,
327 F .3d 466,
471-72 (6th Cir.
2003).
Hill v. Marston,
13 F.3d 1548,
1549-50 (lith
Cir. 1994).
Hudson Ins. Co.
v. Am. Elec.
Corp., 957 F.2d

HYBRID LAW CASES

Facts implicating federal law
Suit to reverse allegedly
erroneous arbitration award
required reference to federal law
because arbitrator's decision was
predicated in part on federal law
Suit to enforce collective
bargaining agreement required
reference to federal labor law
because law regulated such
agreements
Suit for injury sustained while
working as longshoreman
required reference to federal
harbor workers statute because
statute allegedly dictates
vicarious liability in certain
instances arguably relevant to
case
Suit under state environmental
statute required reference to
federal law because
environmental plan at issue in the
case was required by federal law

Trespass action against cable
company required reference to
federal Cable Act in order to
determine whether company had
authority to trespass
Suit under state securities law
required reference to federal
securities law because state
statute adopted certain federal
securities laws verbatim
Suit alleging breach of insurance
contract required reference to
federal CERCLA because loss
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236. Of the 44 cases remanded to the state court, this is the only one that arguably involved the
interpretation of federal law. In Griffis v. Gulf Coast Pre-Stress Co., Inc., 563 So.2d 1254 (La. Ct. App.
I st Cir. 1990), a Louisiana court of appeals affirmed the unpublished decision by the trial court and
approved of its adherence to state precedent (Crater v. Mesa Offshore Co. 539 So.2d 88 (La. Ct. App.
3rd Cir. 1989)) recognizing that the Louisiana workman's compensation scheme was consistent with
federal law regulation worker's compensation for longshoreman. Thus, although federal law was
arguably involved in the disposition of this case, the better conclusion is that the state court simply
applied state precedent in its one-page opinion and made no determination of federal law. Although a
federal statute was cited, it was not quoted and only barely discussed.
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Case Name
826,829-30
(lith Cir. 1992).
Interstate
Petroleum Corp.
v. Morgan, 228
F.3d 331, 335
(4th Cir. 2000).
Jairath v. Dyer,
!54 F.3d 1280,
1282-84 (lith
Cir. 1998).
Kidd v. S.W.
Airlines, Co.,
891 F.2d 540,
543-44 (5th Cir.
1990).
Lockyer v.
Dynegy, Inc.,
375 F.3d 831,
838-41 (9th Cir.
2004).
MCI Telecomm.
Corp. v.
Graham, 7 F.3d
477,478-79
(6th Cir. 1993).
Metheny v.
Becker, 352
F.3d 458, 460-61 (1"Cir.
2003).
Mich. S. R.R.
Co. v. Branch &
St. Joseph
Counties Rail
Users Assoc.,
Inc., 287 F .3d
568,573-74
(6th Cir. 2002).
Milan Express
Co., Inc. v. W.
Surety Co., 886
F.2d 783, 78689 (6th Cir.
1989).
Morris v. City of
Hobart, 39 F.3d

Facts implicating federal law
event involved environmental
contamination regulated by
CERCLA
Suit alleging breach of gas station
franchise agreement required
reference to Petroleum Marketing
Practices Act because certain
franchising agreements are
regulated by the Act
Suit under state discrimination
statute required reference to
Americans with Disabilities Act
because state statute adopted
certain ADA provisions verbatim
Suiting alleging breach of
employment contract required
reference to federal law because
contract adopted certain phrases
verbatim from federal statute
Suit under state statute regulating
unfair business practices statute
required reference to tariffs filed
with federal agency to determine
permissible rate
Suit alleging breach of contract to
provide telecommunications
services required reference to
federal law because certain
contractual duties were regulated
by FCC provisions
Suit against local zoning board
alleging erroneous decision by
board required reference to the
federal Telecommunications Act
because Act allegedly dictated
board's decision
Suit alleging breach of railroad
contract required reference to
federal railroad laws because
contract required party to obtain
certificates of operation issued
pursuant to federal statute

Suit by motor carriers alleging
breach of shipping contract
required reference to federal
Interstate Commerce Act because
Act and regulations addressed
substantial portions of contractual
duties
Suit alleging breach of settlement
agreement in discrimination suit

~

~ -~

~~

b~

...
Q

't<
.!

=
8

~

=
;:
...c:>t:"'
Q

.... ....
..

Q.

t>ll"'

~.s

[Vol. 75
....

ci.
Q

~~= -c"Sl..
-; B c::
"' . e =
t .ii .. .
;o.-c
~';
'-'ri
"'
....=-=

Q

.. .Q

..

Q.

No

CIA

I

Yes

No

No

SIA

I

Yes

No

No

CIA

I

No

No

Yes

SIA

I

No

N/A

Yes

CIA

I

Yes

NIA

No

FLE

s

Yes

No

No

CIA

I

No

No

Yes

CIA

I

Yes

N/A

No

CIA

I

Yes

No

2006]

HYBRID LAW CASES

b
...""
..

=
C>

-t
f:C
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Facts implicating federal law

1105, 1111-12
(I Oth Cir. 1994).

required reference to Title VII of
federal Civil Rights Act because
suit was originally filed as Title
VII claim
Personal injury suit required
reference to federal
environmental regulations
because plaintiff sought to rely on
defendant's violation of
regulation as per se evidence of
negligence
Suit alleging breach of cable TV
licensing agreement required
reference to federal Cable Act
because Act regulated tariffs,
which were at issue in the case

Mulcahey v.
Columbia
Organic
Chemicals Co.,
Inc., 29 F.3d
148, 151-54
(4th Cir. 1995).
Nashoba
Communications
Ltd. P'ship v.
Town of
Danvers, 893
F.2d 435, 43839 (1st Cir.
1990).
Nichols v.
Harbor Venture,
Inc., 284 F.3d
857,860-61
(8th Cir. 2002).

Nicodemus v.
Union Pac. Co.,
318 F.3d 1231,
1236-38 (lOth
Cir. 2003).
Oliverv.
Trunkline Gas
Co., 796 F.2d
86, 88-90 (5th
Cir. 1986).
Ormet Corp. v.
Ohio Power Co.,
98 F.3d 799,
806-07 (4th Cir.
1998).

Pacheco de
Perez v. AT & T
Co., 139 F.3d
1368, 1374-76
(lith Cir. 1998).
PCS 2000 LP v.
Romulus
Telecomm., Inc.,
148 F.3d 32, 35

Malicious prosecution action for
pursuit of previous declaratory
judgment suit required reference
to a consent decree entered by a
federal court because the consent
decree allegedly foreclosed the
declaratory judgment suit
Trespass and unjust enrichment
action against railroad company
required reference to federal land
grant laws in order to determine
scope of railroad rights under
grants
Breach of contract action for sale
of natural gas required reference
to federal law because federal
Natural Gas Act set the price of
the contract
Breach of contract suit by power
plant licensee alleging right to
federal pollution credits required
reference to EPA regulations
because regulations defined who
an "owner" was for purposes of
pollution credits
Personal injury action by
Venezuelans against U.S
company required reference to
federal treaty because treaty
impacted plaintiffs right to sue
Suit alleging breach of contract to
bid certain price for FCC license
required reference to federal law
because FCC regulations regulate
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Case Name

Facts implicating federal law

(I st Cir. 1998).

bidding practices for licenses
(Note: plaintiffs also lodged tort
action relying on FCC bidding
regulations. The court similarly
found federal jurisdiction
lacking.)
Suit alleging breach of insurance
contract to pay death benefits
required reference to federal law
because decedent's mental
state-which was at issue-was
defined by federal law (due to the
fact that he was a member of the
military)
Wrongful discharge suit required
reference to federal Food Drug
and Cosmetic Act because
plaintiff alleged discharge
occurred in retaliation for refusal
to violate the federal act
Child custody suit required
reference to federal law because
dispute was regulated in part by
federal parental kidnapping laws
Trespass action for failure to
remove waste from land required
reference to federal law because
the duty to remove the waste was
imposed by a EPA-negotiated
consent decree
Derivative action against
corporate directors required
reference to federal antitrust laws
because alleged malfeasance
involved anti competitive behavior
Breach of contract suit by motor
carrier against shipper required
reference to federal Interstate
Commerce Act because Act
regulated certain aspects of such
contracts
Conversion claim against
insurance company for improper
title insurance charges required
reference to federal IRS law
because laws regulated such
charges
Suit alleging breach of duty to
arbitrate contractual disputes
required reference to federal law
because federal law controlled
jurisdiction of Native American
court, whose judgment was

Rice v. Office of
Servicemembers
'Group Life
Ins., 260 F .3d
1240, 1245-46
(I Oth Cir. 200 I).

Rodriguez v. SK
& F Co., 833

F.2d 8, 9 (1st
Cir. 1987).

Rogers v. Platt,
814 F.2d 683,
687-90 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
Sable v. General
Motors corp., 90
F.3d 171, 17475 (6th Cir.
1996).
Seinfeld v.
Austen, 39 F.3d
761, 763-65
(7th Cir. 1994).
Siegel Transfer,
Inc. v. Carrier
Exp., Inc., 54
F.3d 1125,
1138-39 (3rd
Cir. 1995).
Smith v. Indus.
Valley Title Ins.
Co., 957 F.2d
90, 92-93 (3rd
Cir. 1996).
Tamiami
Partners, Ltd. v.
Miccosuke Tribe
oflndians of
Fla., 999 F.2d
503,507-08
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Case Name

Facts implicating federal law

(lith Cir. 1993).

partially at issue

Templeton Bd.
of Sewer
Comm'rs. v.
Am. Tissue
Mills of Mass.,
352 F.3d 33, 3741 (1st Cir.
2003).
Torres v. S. Peru
Copper Corp.,
113 F.3d 540,
542-43 (5th Cir.
1997).

Suit alleging breach of water
treatment contract required
reference to federal regulations
because contract was entered into
pursuant to permission granted by
EPA

U.S. Express
Lines Ltd. v.
Higgins, 281
F.3d 383, 38891 (3d Cir.
2002).
Utley v. Varian
Assocs., Inc.,
811 F.2d 1279,
1282-83 (9th
Cir 1987).
Verizon Md.,
Inc. v. Global
Naps, Inc., 377
F .3d 355, 365
(4th Cir. 2004).

Virgin Islands
Hous. Auth. v.
Am. Arbitration
Ass'n, 27 F.3d
911, 916 (3rd
Cir. 1994).
W. 14th St.
Commercial
Corp. v. 5 W.
14th Owners
Corp., 815 F.2d
188, 194-96 (2d
Cir. 1987).
W. Union
Intern., Inc. v.
Data Dev., Inc.,
41 F.3d 1494,

Personal injury action against
large Peruvian company required
reference to the federal common
law of international relations
because holding a major foreign
company liable in U.S. courts
could have significant diplomatic
implications
Malicious prosecution action
required reference to federal
maritime law because plaintiff
alleged federal law did not
support defendant's claims before
the court
Wrongful termination suit based
on race required reference to
federal affirmative action laws
because federal executive orders
placed certain duties on
employers
Suit alleging that state regulatory
commission incorrectly
interpreted federal law during
regulatory proceedings required
reference to federal law in order
to determine the correctness of
commission's interpretation
Suit alleging breach of contract
to build public housing required
reference to HUD regulations
because contacts were covered
under such regulations
Suit seeking declaration that
condominium contracts were in
effect required reference to
federal condominium statute
because statute regulated parties'
obligations under the contract
Suit alleging failure to pay for
services rendered by
telecommunications required
reference to federal
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Wander v. Kaus,
304 F.3d 856,
858-60 (9th
Cir.2002).
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Facts impUcating federal law
Telecommunications Act because
rates charged for services are
regulated by tariffs filed pursuant
to Act
Suit under state discrimination
statute required reference to
Americans with Disabilities Act
because state statute adopted
certain ADA provisions verbatim
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